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Abstract 
 
 
 
A changing climate could result in conditions that entail a loss of resources and habitat for a 
large portion of the world’s population. This may lead to heightened tensions and the risk of so 
called climate wars erupting. Weakened and failed states that are already prone to the risk of 
conflict appear to be the most vulnerable as they will also lack the resources to mitigate coming 
climate changes and more adverse weather conditions. By combining data from climate-related 
natural disasters and conflict data from the last 30 years this thesis tries to discern whether 
there is already an observable increase in the risk of civil war braking out in a country or 
location ravaged by climate disasters. A country level analysis is complimented by a 
disaggregated analysis utilizing geography information systems (GIS) data to see if there is any 
indication that a more detailed approach nets different results. The core findings of the thesis 
are that there is a heightened risk of civil war in geographical locations that have suffered a 
period of extreme drought, two to three years after the occurrence of the drought. Other types 
of disasters appear neither to increase nor decrease the risk of civil war onset in any significant 
way. Further there is no indication that climate-related natural disasters have any country-wide 
effect on the risk of civil war onset.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 A change of climate and a change of opinion 
 
The last 50 years have constituted a profound change in how we think about our planet. The 
industrious exploits of previous generations have slowly given way to a lingering sense of 
unease. An unease spawned by the thought that there are finite limits to the amount of 
ecological pressure the Earth can handle. When that pressure mounts there are unknown 
consequences as to how humans will react. When the world changes into a warmer and 
presumably more hostile planet will we our self also turn more hostile towards each other? This 
claim is made by several ecological theorists and various scenarios that factor in diminishing 
resources and decreased living conditions in the near future. In this paper I will try to discern if 
we already have available data that indicate an empiric linkage between climate change and 
civil conflict. I will argue that there might already exist a feasible link between certain climate-
related natural disasters and an increased risk of conflict.  
 
Ecological and environmental damage are young ideas historically. The industrial revolution cut 
away forests and clogged cities with coal fired chimneys and sulphurous smoke, but the notion 
that this could be unsustainable behavior did not catch on until the latter half of the 20th 
century. First appearing in The New Yorker in 1962, Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring" is credited 
for banning the pesticide DDT, starting the American environmental movement and the first 
real questioning of humanity's strong faith in technological progress and prowess (Carson 1962; 
Griswold 2012). Following in the footsteps of Carson, several scientists started asking questions 
about Earth's capacity for human exploits. In 1972 a group of scientists first sounded the alarm 
that still tolls on today: "The Limits To Growth" famously tried to predict when humankind 
would cross the threshold of sustainable development (Meadows et al. 1972). The authors 
updated their predictions in the 1992 revision gloomily titled "Beyond The Limits To Growth" 
(Meadows et al. 1992). The earliest concerns for sustainable development were mostly 
centered on air pollution, hazardous chemicals and the deterioration of the ozone layer. Every 
one of these concerns are still present today, but what became more and more clear during the 
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seventies and eighties was the fact that the pollution aided the atmospheric effect that is now 
known as the greenhouse effect. As we move into the 21ist century the debate has changed 
markedly from those earlier and uncertain times. First, it was a debate on whether climate 
change was real or not (Mann 2012). Now the debate has moved on to how to stop the world 
from warming more than the perceived vital two Celsius degrees (Stocker 2013). Some have 
already relinquished the idea of stopping climate change and instead moved the debate over to 
how one can best adapt to the changes that are coming (Pielke et al. 2007).  The pace is fast 
and the facts are chilling: “We are the first humans ever to breathe air with 400 parts per million 
of carbon dioxide” , reminded general secretary of the UN Ban Ki-Moon assembled journalists 
at the end of last year (Ki-Moon 2013). We are already well into uncharted territory. 
 
Moreover, the last few years the debate has increasingly shifted towards the effect of climate 
change on human behaviour. “Climate migration” and “climate refugees” are becoming just as 
important discussion points as climate change itself. Furthermore, several researchers engage 
in a debate on whether climate change can spur an increase in human violence and conflict 
(Buhaug 2014; Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang et al. 2013; Theisen et al. 2011). The important 
question asked is how people will react if adversity and scarcity follow in the wake of climate 
change and altered weather cycles.  Will everyone pull together and join forces, or will there be 
a final desperate race for the last resources available?  
 
1.2 When the chips are down 
 
There seems to be a wide breech in the opinions on how humankind will react if the effects of 
climate change turn out to meet the direst of the predictions. Prominent figures, like U.S. 
president Barack Obama in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, have warned about coming 
clashes and wars because of climate change (Obama 2009). Among the most alarmist examples 
are a report from Christian Aid that claims one billion refugees from the effects of climate 
change will “de-stabilize whole regions while increasingly desperate populations compete for 
dwindling food and water” (Aid 2007). Invoking even stronger visions of apocalypse was a 
Pentagon report from 2003 before that warned of the risk of a reversal to a Hobbesian state of 
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nature where humankind would fight “constant battles for diminishing resources” (Schwartz 
and Randall 2003). Naturally, these kind of astonishing predictions garner media attention and 
headlines. They are, however, not at all compatible with what the scientific community has to 
say on the same subject.  
There are only a handful of studies that claim any relevant linkage between climate and the 
number of wars being fought (Burke et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2006). Current conflict research 
seems to agree that the character of the governing regime, population and wealth are the 
strongest determining factors when predicting the risk of a civil conflict developing (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Hegre et al. 2012). Other strong cases have been 
made for variables that include ethnic and religious divides within a society (Cederman et al. 
2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
Although few studies report it, a linkage between wars and climate changes is empirically 
feasible. Homer-Dixon among others have theroized a model that presents a linkage between 
the two, but so far data limitations have rendered most conclusions severely hamstrung and 
also heavily disputed (Homer-Dixon 2010). Further clouding the picture is the fact that the 
current period, where one could argue that the effects of climate change and global warming 
are being made manifest, is happening simultaneously with a period that is seeing a distinct fall 
in the number of conflicts worldwide (Buhaug et al. 2009). 
 
Therefore, the puzzle remains, and the outcome of it is likely to affect all of us in the coming 
years. My thesis attempts to contribute to this vital field of research, and will investigate 
whether climate related-natural disasters provide any effect when looking at the risk of civil war 
onset for the last 30 years. Climate-related natural disasters are measurable, have a high 
human impact, and are proven in becoming more regular and of a greater magnitude in the last 
fifty years (CRED 2007). Therefore, I argue that such disasters provide a pragmatic tool for 
trying to discern effects of global warming on human behaviour. As the question remains big 
and cumbersome, and the data available is of discussable quality, I will utilize a different 
approach to investigate the contested linkage. My approach will make use of data and employ 
methods that give a high amount of detail. This leaves me with a disaggregated model to 
identify a linkage between climate-related natural disasters and the risk of civil war onset.  
[5] 
 
 
1.3 Research Question and hypothesis 
 
This thesis main research question is thus: 
 
Do climate related natural disasters affect the risk of civil war onset?  
 
To answer this question I will perform a quantitative analysis with a global scope consisting of 
data from the last 30 years. My main independent variables will be climate related natural 
disasters. My main dependent variable is the risk of a civil war breaking out, known as civil war 
onset in the literature, and my main control variables are various socio-political factors such as 
prosperity, social fractionalization and population size.  
There are only a handful of climate-related natural disasters that are possible to isolate and 
measure. Wildfires, mudslides, storms and cold snaps are all related to volatile weather, but 
they are infrequent and some are hard to measure correctly. Since my main analysis is 
disaggregated I have chosen the two climate-related natural disaster variables that are the 
most common in frequency and therefore also perform the best in the analysis: droughts and 
floods. Several studies that discuss the same themes as my thesis utilize these disaster variables 
(Benjaminsen et al. 2012; Theisen et al. 2011; Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). 
My hypothesis are as follows:  
 
H1) Climate-related natural disasters do no not provide an immediate increase in the risk 
of a conflict breaking out in the affected area.  
 
H2) Negative impact from climate-related natural disasters will provide a long term 
increase in the risk of conflict in the affected area.  
 
H3) Climate-related natural disasters do not provide country-wide effects for the risk of a 
civil war onset.  
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1.4 Structure  
 
I argue that there are important differences when analysing climate-related natural disaster 
and the risk of civil war onset on a local level and on a country-wide level. Therefore the 
analysis will be carried out in two steps and at two different levels of analysis. Firstly, I will 
analyse whether climate change affects the risk of civil war onset at country level. The country-
level data is a replication of Slettebak (2012) analysis and utilizes data from Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and the EM-DAT disaster database (CRED 2007). Secondly, I 
will perform a GIS-based analysis on a grid-level by utilizing data obtained from the PRIO-GRID 
dataset (Tollefsen et al. 2012). The disaggregated analysis also uses data from the Dartmouth 
Flood Observatory (Brackenridge et al. 2009) and a variable constructed from the dataset of 
Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: I will start by introducing the existing research done in the 
areas that concern my thesis. From there I will elaborate on the theoretic framework that will 
underpin the analysis. Discussed in this part are contributions from Thomas Homer-Dixon’s 
main model of how resource scarcity may lead to an increase in conflict and violence (Homer-
Dixon 2010). In chapter 4 I will present the research design, the methods employed and the 
coding of the various variables along with complete descriptive statistics. I will also discuss 
missing data and my reasons for choosing a disaggregated analysis. The results of the analysis 
are presented in chapter 5 along with a brief discussion of the findings that in short indicate 
that there is an observable increase in the risk of civil war onset in cells that have experienced a 
catastrophic drought two to three years prior to the conflict. The robustness of the various 
models is explored in chapter 6. Finally I will elaborate on the results from the analysis, discuss 
the positive observations more in depth and present a summary and a conclusion in chapter 7.  
 
1.5 Defining Concepts 
 
With my hypothesis established I know move on to explain the most important concepts that 
will be discussed throughout this thesis.  
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1.5.1 Climate Change 
 
Allow this limited technical explanation: The sun rays hitting earth are short band radiation, 
whereas outbound radiation from earth is long range. Water vapor, carbon dioxide, 
chlorofluorocarbons, methane, nitrous oxide and ozone - are transparent to short wave 
radiation but opaque to long range radiation (Cline 1991). This heat trap is the so called 
greenhouse effect. Without it the mean temperature on Earth would be - 18 degrees Celsius. 
While essential to life on earth, the greenhouse effect can be manipulated by an increase in the 
release of greenhouse gasses. The increasingly reflective quality of the layer returns more and 
more heat back to earth. Alongside an increase in human emissions, the natural CO2 emissions 
could also be increasing rapidly. Deforestation, warmer oceans and less snow and ice all have a 
profound effect on the natural radiation equation that determines the mean temperature of 
the planet (Jenkinson et al. 1991). The greenhouse effect is the main mechanic behind what we 
call global warming. The phrase was first coined in 1975, but became part of the common 
language after NASA scientist James E. Hansen testified before the U.S. Senate (Senate 1988). 
The last decades have been marked by intense fights over the scientific evidence behind global 
warming and the amount of precision in the predictions for the future. At the center of the 
fight is the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).   
 
While constantly under siege from a very vocal minority, the IPCC constitutes the most 
thorough research body on the subject of global warming. Especially after the gaffe that 
predicted the melting of the Himalayan glaciers by 2035 the panel has strengthened its peer 
reviewed processes and gained the support of  the majority of the scientific community (IPCC 
2010; Susan 2007). The frequent attacks on the IPCC’s research from scientists funded by 
lobbying groups and energy corporations have led to several open letters from troubled 
scientists that fear the ongoing debate is being cluttered on purpose (Adams and others 2010). 
In IPCC’ latest report from this autumn the tone is firmer than ever regarding the conclusions 
from its research:  
“The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since the Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4). It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in 
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global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together.” (Allen 
et al. 2014: 5) 
The consequences are ricing ocean levels, more extreme weather, fewer habitable areas and a 
general degradation in the quality of livelihood for a large share of the world’s population (see 
IPCC 2013: 19-27 for a full listing of the predicted consequences). In the face of this jarring 
evidence the World community has so far failed to be able to launch any significant 
countermeasures. Costs, distribution of negative effects and responsibility and especially a 
strong divide between developing and developed nations have all contributed to making the 
process stagnate. Some progress has been in the last year with a bi-lateral agreement between 
China and the United States, but environmentalists were quick to point out that the agreement 
have plenty of included caveats (Landler 2014; Shuo 2014). Some scientists even argue that the 
human psyche plays a part in the failure to accept the consequences of unmitigated climate 
change:   
 
"Maybe there is some sort of in-built safety mechanism, or comfort blanket, that makes us 
assume that tomorrow will be pretty much the same as today; that the world when we are 
middle-aged or old will be, broadly speaking, the same as it was when we were young" (McGuire 
2012) 
Michael E. Mann tells the story of how climate sceptics have gained an unreasonable amount of 
ground in large thanks to mass media's lack of fact checking and the simple fact that climate 
skepticism is a far more comforting alternative than accepting the facts of global warming 
(Mann 2012). Lobbying, reluctance to accept the magnitude of the situation and strong 
economic interests will all probably continue to try to clutter the debate in the coming years. As 
far as this paper is concerned, it is sufficient to assume that climate change is upon us and that 
its effects will be felt in the imminent future.  
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1.5.2 Conflict 
 
The other main variable in this paper is the onset of civil conflict. As interstate wars have 
become a rare phenomenon after the end of World War II, civil wars and armed conflicts make 
up almost the entirety of the conflicts that the world experiences from year to year. Civil 
conflict is a well-known and oft-used measure in peace and conflict-studies and I will make use 
of the same definition that the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset codebook lists as: 
 
"...a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in 
at least 25 battle-related deaths.” 
(See Harbom and others (2009) for the full definition parameters.) 
 
To be classified as a full size civil war the amount of casualties has to exceed 1000 in the span of 
a year. Both warfare and violence in general has been on the decline in the last period of 
human history (Goldstein 2011; Pinker 2011). This decline is also seen in the civil war literature, 
where the end of the cold war signaled a drastic change in the number of armed conflicts 
around the world and the number of people killed in battle (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Lacina et al. 
2006). A minor increase has been seen after 2005, but according to the predictions this trend 
will continue downwards and by 2050 roughly half of the countries that today host a conflict 
will be conflict-free according to Hegre et al. (2012). The main explanation is the United 
Nations' outlook for a continued worldwide reduction of poverty, considering that gross 
domestic product per capita is a significant variable in predicting the risk of civil wars erupting 
in a given country. At the time of writing the latest available data from 2012 show that were 23 
intrastate conflicts, 8 internationalized intrastate conflicts and a single interstate conflict 
ongoing (UCDP 2012).   
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Figure 1.1: Annual battle deaths in civil wars and number of countries in a civil war. Model from 
(Bank 2011) 
 
 
Source: (Lacina et al. 2006) 
 
 
 
Choosing civil war as a measure of conflict or violence may at first glance not be deemed as 
intuitive, but there are several factors that strengthen this choice. Cunningham and Lemke 
(2011) explain that the factors used to explain civil war also can be suitable predictors for other 
forms of violence, such as assassinations and riots. The overlap in findings between studies 
suggests that the theories that are used to explain civil war onset represent more general 
mechanisms about the occurrence of violence (Nygard and Weintraub 2011). Since 1946 the 
great majority of conflicts in the world have been intrastate (see Figure 1.2) and there is 
therefore a lot more data available for analysis.  
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Figure 1.2: Amount and type of conflicts per year, 1946-2010.
 
Source: (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011) 
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2.0 Literature Overview 
 
In this section I will try to give a brief overview of the most important literature that has formed 
the basis for my thesis. From a short overview of civil war I will move into the discussion around 
scarcity and the different models that have been put forth to try to explain an empirical link 
between climate changes, resource scarcity and the effects it has upon the chances of conflict.  
 
2.1 Civil War  
 
The Civil War literature is vast and it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to give a complete 
overview of its contents. The literature has seen a surge of several large-n statistical studies 
that focus on explaining factors that lead to the outbreak of violence at a certain point in time 
(see Hegre et al. 2001; Hegre et al. 2012 for examples of this approach; Zhang et al. 2006).  
While most studies take the approach that the outbreak of conflict is mostly answered by state 
capacity and operation, e.g. that the state controls the allocation of resources, there is also the 
debate as to whether intra-state violence mainly stem from a greed or grievance motivation 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The more economic approach has also 
spawned the contest model in which several groups fight over the same resources (Garfinkel 
and Skaperdas 2007). Naturally the relevance of ethnic fractionalization and the way different 
factions interact with each other have been of great interest to scholars of civil war (Cederman 
et al. 2009; Esteban et al. 2012).  Ethnic nationalism is popularly viewed as one of the leading 
source of group cohesion and intergroup civil conflict; of 709 minority ethnic groups identified 
around the world, at least 100 had members engage in an ethnically based rebellion against the 
state during 1945 to 1998 (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Fearon 2006). 
Equally important is the discussion of political instability and the effect of different regimes 
upon the risks of civil war (Gates et al. 2006; Gleditsch et al. 2009; Hegre et al. 2001). Dominant 
results across several studies are that state capacity in the form of wealth and civil liberties 
decrease the risk of conflict while states that are subject to frequent power shifts and poor 
income are faced with greater risk of civil war.  
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The state centric approach that many of the studies that rely on the same definition that this 
thesis does is of interest as it has been the target of some recent critique. Fjelde and Nilsson 
(2012) notes that the literature does not account for the complexity of civil conflicts where 
there is often more than one active rebel group and that the dyadic relationship between state 
and rebels should be more detailed.  
Sociology has also contributed strongly to the civil war research literature with micro level 
studies on the effects of warfare. Especially the rationale behind group level resource conflicts 
have a strong tradition within sociology (Etzioni 1975; Olson 1971). Many of these studies also 
concern themselves with questions of leadership or the importance of the presence of a 
charismatic character. A lot of these questions also find their way into the more macro-oriented 
civil war literature (Buhaug and Gates 2002). 
Having briefly given a short overview of the recent civil war literature I now move into the 
literature concerning this thesis’ main independent variable.  
 
2.2 Scarcity: The origins of climate war 
 
The idea of so called climate wars originates from another concept: The competition for limited 
resources. Fighting for food and territory is as old as nature itself, but it is usually at its most 
fierce when several animals are forced to share the same limited habitat. A nearly dried out 
watering hole in the savannah is often the stage for struggles of life and death between its 
inhabitants, over who gets to drink and who does not. This very scenario, played out by humans, 
has troubled thinkers and statesmen throughout history. The English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes thought that the equality of man meant that the state of nature for humankind was a 
constant war where everyone would be willing to use violence to secure every advantage 
possible and that life was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1928). Hobbes 
gloomy conception of man as a developed animal held in check only by the social contract and 
the fear of punishment from a strong state paves the way for many unappealing scenarios.  The 
thought of society degrading back into the most basic of Darwinist competition has never been 
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fully ousted, but it was a stronger factor when the question of sustainability, in simple terms of 
producing enough food, seemed nearer than today.  
 
T.R. Malthus and his predictions at the start of the 19th century that the world would struggle 
to feed its population spurred a line of thinking that inquired what the maximum capacity of 
the earth could be (Malthus 1888). Malthus cited the inability to increase food production as 
one of the forces that would keep world population in check, through a natural culling that 
would take place once population exceeded food production. Through these Malthusian checks 
the world population would then return to sustainable levels. Though proven wrong, 
Malthusianism has resurged several times, most notably in the form of a group of Neo-
Malthusianists who believed that the population surge after World War II would result in 
hunger catastrophes and Malthusian checks in the following decades (Ehrlich and Club 1971). 
The Green Revolution halted the Neo-Malthusianists, but the question has been given a new 
vitality with the advent of climate change. Though the total effects of climate change on crop 
production are hard to adequately model seeing that they contain as many factors such as 
available water for irrigation, the level of agricultural technology, fertilizer improvements, 
amount of air pollution and C02-leveles, there have been attempts. Rosenzweig and Parry found 
in an early attempt that the total amount of crop production would probably be close to 
constant with climate change (Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). The rationale is that warmer 
weather will give more crops in the northern hemisphere and vice versa in the southern 
hemisphere. Not only is less precipitation in some areas a concern, more extreme precipitation 
(like monsoons) could increase topsoil erosion and reduce production output (Buhaug et al. 
2009). Rosenzweig and Parry note that this will probably lead to severe food shortages for the 
majority of the world's less developed countries unless some system of crop exchange is put in 
place. This prediction has held firm through further research into the effects of CO2 (Tubiello 
and others 2007) and updated models from the IPCC (Parry et al. 2005). As well as food, water 
availability will also come under pressure with global warming. Regions that depend on a snow-
based hydrological cycle will become severely affected and may experience water shortages 
according to the estimates from the IPCC (Barnett et al. 2005). While inconclusive for the world 
at large, a conservative estimate is that there could be stronger competition for resources on a 
regional level stemming from the effects of climate change (Stocker 2013).  
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If we accept scarcity as a likely, though not certain, consequence of global warming the next 
question is what scarcity will lead to? In his book "Environment, Scarcity and Violence" Thomas 
Homer-Dixon argues the fact that scarcity could lead to violence (Homer-Dixon 2010). Homer-
Dixon's main argument is that environmental scarcity, created by supply-induced, demand-
induced and structural scarcity, leads to social segmentation and weakened institutions. When 
environmental scarcity manifests itself, constrained economic productivity will lead to the elites 
trying to secure themselves buy rent-seeking which in turn leads to expulsion and possibly 
migration by those that suffer from this behavior. The end results of this social segmentation 
are according to Homer-Dixon group-identity conflicts, coups d’état and insurgencies. Often 
misinterpreted, it is important to note that the author clearly states that “environmental 
scarcity is never a sole or sufficient cause of large migrations, poverty, or violence; it always 
joins with other economic, political, and social factors to produce its effects” (Homer-Dixon 
2010: 16) 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Sources and consequences of environmental scarcity. Model  from Homer-Dixon (2010) 
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Homer-Dixon sees intra-state wars for resources, easily fitting within the realist framework, as 
less than likely. Only easily exploitable resources like petroleum and minerals are worth trying 
to conquer another state for, according to Homer-Dixon, because renewable resources (e.g. 
fish, grain and forests) cannot so easily be converted into short term wealth. Also dismissed is 
the claim that the world will be facing a series of "water-wars" between states in the near 
future (Bulloch and Darwish 1993) as Homer-Dixon argues these types of wars also will be 
internal in nature. To sum up, Homer-Dixon's main argument is that fighting over scarcity (more 
specifically a scarcity of renewable resources) will manifest itself in intra-state conflict such as 
insurgencies and ethnic clashes as different groups vie for control over the diminished supply of 
resources. 
As for possibly reasons as to why this has not been proven yet, Homer-Dixon offers the opinion 
that environmental scarcity is often overlooked because analysts simply focus on the social 
stress that stems from the environmental scarcity and thus are overlooking the cause of it 
(Homer-Dixon 2010). The caveat is that it is near impossible to discern the relative weight of 
environmental scarcity and the interactive effect it produces on social stress. Homer-Dixon 
offers no solution to this problem, but simply implies that the effect is greatly overlooked and 
undervalued by most researchers.  
 
Figure 2.2: Possible pathways from climate change to conflict. Model from Buhaug et al. (2009). 
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Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen present a more refined version of Homer-Dixon’s original model 
and identify five social effects from climate change that are suggested to be crucial catalysts for 
organized violence (Buhaug et al. 2009). First, reduced state income stemming from resource 
scarcity may reduce political legitimacy through promises that cannot be delivered and give 
momentum to political challengers. Second, increased resource competition within a 
heterogeneous society may intensify social cleavages and make the population more prone to 
radicalization. Third, loss of resources in a subsistence-economy may lead to unemployment 
and a negative impact on the economy, again reducing state income. Fourth, fighting or 
adapting to climate change may lead to increased tensions and could give rise to actors with 
hidden agendas (Salehyan 2008).  Finally, adverse environmental effects may force people to 
migrate and will put increased pressure on the areas where people migrate to. Again, it is 
important to keep in mind that the end product of the model is an increase in the risk of armed 
conflict, and that none of the factors are sufficient in themselves: Rich and stable states could 
shoulder the increased pressure from the effects, while weak states stand a larger risk of 
nearing the critical threshold.   
 
2.3 Trying to link climate and conflict 
 
When discussing the link between climate and conflict one should note that the recent trend of 
increasing temperature has coincided with a decrease in the number of active conflicts across 
the world. This is a very simple bivariate assessment, but it serves to prove that caution is 
needed when discussing climate wars as something that is bound to happen (Buhaug et al. 
2009).    
 
The effect of what Homer-Dixon titles social stress has been tried conceptualized in civil war 
research. Several of the casual chains that Homer-Dixon provides in his model are already an 
established part of the literature: Poverty (in the form of GDP per capita or development) has 
been found to be a robust variable for predicting the chance of a civil war outbreak. The same 
goes for a large population in the country of question (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). More specifically for this paper Koubi 
et al. (2012) refutes that the link between climate change, economic growth and conflict is 
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provable and that more research with better indicators is needed to come closer to any 
conclusions. Bergholt and Lujala (2012) finds that climate-related natural disasters negatively 
affect economic development in the affected country, but the economic downturn does not 
translate into increased risk of civil war as proposed by Homer-Dixon. This last paper bears an 
extra mention as it severs the link between step 2 and 3 of Homer-Dixon's model (see figure 
2.1).  
 
Other attempts at creating casual chains between climate change and civil conflict have been 
attempted, especially the link between dry and wet periods and violence in Africa. Case studies 
by Adano et al. (2012), Theisen (2012) and Butler and Gates (2012) all find that wetter periods 
in different regions of Africa are in fact associated with an increased risk of violence and/or 
conflict. Benjaminsen et al. (2012) finds little evidence that environmental and water scarcity 
are important drivers for inter-communal conflicts in Mali while Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) 
finds that there is a slightly increased risk of violence after heavy rain after examining a dataset 
for social conflict in Africa. Theisen et al. (2011) dispute the claim that periods of severe 
drought in Sub-Saharan Africa lead to increased levels of conflict and violence. Wischnath and 
Buhaug (2014) studies the link between climate variability and conflict in Asia and fails to find a 
systematic relationship between the two. A recent study of the linkage between drinking water 
availability and conflict risk by Böhmelt et al. (2013) finds that conflict risk is more influenced by 
rising demand than by a climate-influenced reduction in supply.  
 
On the other end of the scientific spectrum Zhang et al. (2006) tries to utilize a long-term 
perspective by utilizing climate data from the entirety of the last millennium for China. They 
find that colder periods introduced a slightly higher risk of conflict. The same results also goes 
for Tol and Wagner (2010) who uses similar methods for Europe. They also introduce the 
finding that the relation weakens with the advent of the industrial world. Possible explanations 
are thought to be a semi-Malthusian effect caused by reduced crops yields during colder 
periods.  
 
Finally, the link between climate and conflict has seen several debates in the last years, many of 
them involving research director Halvard Buhaug of The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). 
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Burke et al. (2009) claims that global warming increases the risk of conflict in Africa. This claim 
was disputed and debunked by Buhaug (2010a).  Buhaug has also engaged in another debate 
with Hsiang et al. (2013) over their compilation of different studies that look at the effects 
between climate and violence. According to the Hsiang et al’s summary of sixty different 
studies there is significant evidence for a 14 percent increase in violence between groups if the 
climate changes with one standard deviation. Buhaug claims that this compilation-study is 
victim to the previous errors of limited causality made by the studies included in the 
compilation. Buhaug also questions the selection of the included studies and the conclusions 
the authors have drawn from their own findings (Bilden 2013; Buhaug 2014; Hsiang and Meng 
2014).  
 
This concludes a short overview of the literature and history concerning scarcity, climate 
change and civil war. I now move on to discuss why there are good reasons to look into how 
these variables interact.  
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3.0 Theory  
 
In this section I argue for the use of climate-related natural disasters as an adequate measure 
for the impact from climate change. I also discuss why there are caveats with modeling human 
behavior stemming from exogenous shocks such as natural disasters.  
3.1 Disastrous weather 
 
The list of possible effects of climate change makes it very hard to adequately model the 
changes it may bring. For the purposes of this paper I have chosen to focus on the increase in 
extreme weather phenomenon, which in turn leads to more frequent occurrence of climate-
related natural disasters. A climate-related natural disaster can be defined by the occurrence of 
a natural hazard that affects a vulnerable population so that it causes damage and/or deaths. 
The hazard in itself does not cause a natural disaster, a disaster must by definition affect a 
socio-economic environment, so disasters in unpopulated areas do not constitute disasters 
(Dilley 2005). Given these definitions natural hazards can develop into natural disasters, but this 
depends on human resilience and vulnerability. The hazard in this case can be heavy rainfall or 
high temperatures, but if it turns into a disaster is determined by the settlement in question's 
ability to cope with the given hazard. The hazard of heavy rainfall may for example cause flash 
floods in one area, while a properly built city with adequate drainage may experience no 
damage at all. Human preparedness and a society's institutional ability to adapt to natural 
hazards therefore constitutes a large part of what determines a natural disaster (Birkmann 
2006). What follows from this definition is that human settlement may in itself be the cause of 
natural disasters - if improperly planned to not account for natural hazards (e.g. settlements 
threatened by the coming rise in sea-levels). Another implication is that natural disasters occur 
more often in poor or undeveloped areas, simply because the infrastructure cannot withstand 
the exogenous shock. A good illustrative example (though not climate-related) is the Loma 
Prieta earthquake in San Francisco in 1989 compared to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Both were 
magnitude 7.0 earthquakes, 62 people died in the Loma Prieta earthquake, an estimated 
220.000 died in the Haiti earthquake. Socio economic conditions and building policies were 
obviously the main differentiating factors behind the different outcomes. 
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The increase in climate-related natural disasters during the last 60 years can clearly be seen in 
the data used in this paper. 
 
Figure 2.3: Number of climate-related disasters per year vs. earthquakes. Graph from Slettebak (2012) 
 
Source: CRED (2007) 
 
The increase in disasters also contains the fact that more severe disasters occur more often 
than previously (see McGuire 2012; Peterson and others 2012; Van Aalst 2006; Watson et al. 
2000 for more). There are relevant weaknesses to the very visual increase in the number of 
climate-related natural disasters however. The data reported can be susceptible to 
authoritarian regimes trying to make their countries seem less troubled than in reality. For 
example: A lot of data is missing from the earlier days of the communist regime in China. 
Advancements in technology may also have contributed to improved reporting and routines 
over time. However, the fact that reported earthquakes stay consistent while climate-related 
disasters skyrocket after 1980 goes a long way to alleviate some of the reporting concerns.  
 
3.2 Using climate-related natural disasters as a measure 
 
There are clear weaknesses and strengths in using natural disasters as a measuring stick for 
climate change. For one, there are other ways to measure natural disasters that do not adhere 
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to the human impact definition chosen by this paper. Purely force-based measures are 
naturally untroubled by political agendas as long as there is sufficient measuring stations in 
place see Brancati (2007); Burke et al. (2009 for examples of this approach), but when 
approaching the subject of conflict and climate I side with Slettebak in his approach to the data:  
 
"...humans react to the consequences of natural forces, not the forces in themselves. (...) Thus, 
the most relevant measure is the level of adversity resulting from a severe weather event, not 
the force of the weather event in itself.” 
(Slettebak 2012) 
 
The consequence based measure also takes human disaster adaptation into account 
endogenously, which would be lost if applying a simple force-based measure. A further 
poignant point of discussion is whether to classify natural hazards as exogenous or endogenous 
shocks. On the one hand we do not command where rain falls or where a storm gathers; on the 
other there is the vulnerability and resilience aspect of how we define a natural disaster. Social 
research usually contains endogenous phenomena and it is hard to finally define which way the 
effects pull. For the purpose of this paper I will follow the concept that natural hazards are 
exogenous shocks that contribute to exogenous variation in the results even though disasters 
are defined by the way they influence human lives. I view this as a compatible for the research 
even though I argue that climate-related natural disasters are in effect anthropogenic, the 
amount of complicity is of course debatable. The task of discerning whether each climate-
related natural disaster in the dataset was in fact caused by poor adaptability or simply by 
overwhelming force is too large for this paper, and therefore the exogenous result is chosen as 
default. Trying to limit the endogenous effect of the data I will limit the disaster data to floods 
and droughts, due to data constrains.  
 
Another positive effect of choosing to work with climate-related natural disasters is the fact 
that rapid onset disasters do not facilitate adaptation and external intervention in the same 
way that long time climate change will. This makes any observed correlation more likely to be a 
genuine causal relationship (Theisen et al. 2013). 
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3.3 Why does it matter? 
 
How do climate-related natural disasters and the risk of intrastate conflict interact? If we follow 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) in their interpretation any damage to interior infrastructure will 
increase the risk. If areas become isolated and/or roads deteriorate, it will become harder for 
the government to police or respond to any type of insurgency. While partly contested by 
Bergholt and Lujala (2012) many other researchers see any type of reduction in GNP as 
increasing the risk of civil war because of the subsequent reduction in state capacity. Bergholt 
and Lujala (2012) finds the reduction in GNP after a country is struck by a climate-natural 
disaster, but does not find any increased risk resulting from the reduction. Generally it can be 
said that natural disasters generate a large amount of uncertainty, strife, insecurity, frustration 
and scarcity. Several authors argue that these effects transform into an increased risk of 
violence (Brancati 2007; Homer-Dixon 2010; Nel and Righarts 2008).There is also the evidence 
of looting taking place in the aftermath of disasters, which again can lead to an increase in 
violence (Barsky et al. 2006).  
 
Sociology has tried explaining human behavior in the aftermath of natural disasters all the way 
back to Durkheim, who found that social disturbances and wars led to greater social integration 
(Durkheim 1951). Durkheim’s findings indicated a diminished risk of chaos and violence after 
natural disasters because of the suddenly common bond between the victims. The American 
scientist Charles E. Fritz picked up where Durkheim left of after the end of World War II. The 
reason that he became known for the first large-scale research into human post-disaster 
behavior was the American interest in trying to predict how the civil population would react to 
a large scale nuclear attack. As only two nuclear attacks has ever been launched, Fritz and his 
colleague turned to questionnaires distributed after natural disasters in the USA and interviews 
conducted after the allied bombing campaigns in Germany.    
  
“How do human beings act in such a situation? According to a pervasive popular conception, 
they panic, trampling each other and losing all sense of concern for their fellow human beings. 
After panic has subsided so the image indicates they turn to looting and exploitation, while the 
community is rent with conflict. Large numbers of people are left permanently deranged 
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mentally. This grim picture, with its many thematic variations, is continually reinforced by novels, 
movies, radio and television programs, and journalistic accounts of disaster." 
(Charles E Fritz and Williams 1957) 
 
Fritz came to a wholly different conclusion: “Even under the worst circumstances, people 
maintained or quickly regained self-control and became concerned about the welfare of others” 
(Charles Edward Fritz 1961). He tried to dispel what he considered a wrongful image of "base 
human behavior" after disasters that he thought had falsely been put in place. Like Durkheim 
he also finds what he calls "a community of sufferers", united by an external threat that brings 
them together. Fritz' findings are largely backed up by other disaster sociologists (Barsky et al. 
2006; Hodgkinson and Stewart 1991; Peacock et al. 1997). The caveat however is that Fritz, and 
most of the other disasters dissected by sociologists all took place in western industrialized 
nations. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Kolbe et al. (2010) estimated over 11.000 incidents of 
sexual violence in the six weeks following the earthquake. They also found greatly increased 
risks of physical assault, illness and malnutrition among more than half the population of the 
Port-au-Prince in contrast to a matching survey that was undertaken a year before the 
earthquake. There is a large literature on the problems of sexual violence in the aftermath of 
natural disasters, that all conclude with a highly increased risk for women and young girls in the 
immediate chaos and turmoil of a natural disaster (Enarson and Morrow 1998; Felten-Biermann 
2006; Fisher 2010). 
 
The picture of human reactions in a disaster aftermath is not a clear cut one, as we can see by 
the differing theories. It is also strongly affect by who you happen to be. Ethnicity, gender and 
marginalization play a large role in how much hardship one must endure in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster, and it also strongly affects if one survives at all in the first place (Busch 2012; 
Peacock et al. 1997) 
 
Since this analysis provides the option for the effects from climate-related natural disasters to 
affect the results both negatively and positively I find it defensibly to utilize the variables as 
indicators of impact from a changing climate. However, as discussed in this section, the 
sociology, psychology and societal conditions of an affected population plays a large part in 
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how people will react to these events. Accounting for these factors would be preferable, but as 
I will discuss in my next chapter there is a clear limit to what a large scale model can take into 
account.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[26] 
 
 
4.0 Research Design 
4.1 Why a statistical analysis?  
 
Every researcher must make a choice as to what method is the most relevant and effective way 
of reaching the answers to the research questions at hand. The goal is to end up with a 
scientific product that maintains high degrees of both validity and reliability while 
simultaneously making inferences that are interesting and relevant. King, Keohane and Verba 
keep the viewpoint that political scientists should strive to combine both the qualitative 
methods,  strong on validity but sometimes weaker on the reliability, with the quantitative 
methods that exhibit reverse strengths (King et al. 1995). Ultimately, according to the authors, 
both methods rely on the same logic of making reliable inferences; avoiding bias and getting 
the most out of your data. A sound research design is the best framework for successful theory 
evaluation and that is precisely what this paper sets out to do.  
When choosing between a qualitative method and a quantitative research method the tradeoff 
is about what kind of inferences the researcher can make. Explaining a specific problem like 
why there was an armed conflict in Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan in 1988, and how it was affected 
or related to the flooding of the Ravi river requires an in depth study of that particular situation, 
but fails to give answers that are readily reliable for other regions, conflicts or disasters. Large 
statistical analysis, like this one, have the strength of being able to compare a large number of 
events and factors but suffer from the fact that the observations are weak on detailed 
information. Utilizing such a large amount of data often brings into the question the validity of 
the indicators that are being used. The phenomena that we are trying to describe are seldom 
encompassed wholly within the data at hand.  This creates a distance between what we want 
to say something about, and what we really say (Busch 2012: 27). While useful for saying 
something about the relationship between different phenomena, statistical methods limit the 
general inferences one can make about specific social effects. Naturally statistical methods also 
allow the researcher to handle large amounts of observations and make systematic inferences 
about the correlations in the data while being less prone to selection bias than in qualitative 
case studies.  
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4.2 Why disaggregate? 
 
While popular with social scientists, the usage of country-level data does not provide a very 
high level of accuracy when it comes to most effects and phenomena. There are countless 
examples to choose from, but for this paper it will serve to point out that any correlation 
between a hypothetical drought in the east of Russia and a an outbreak of civil war in the west 
of Russia would be less than ideal. The two events would correlate in a country level analysis 
but in reality they would have taken place at two geographical points that are as far apart from 
each other as London, United Kingdom and Nome, Alaska. When it comes to natural disasters 
there is already an established precedent among earlier research to utilize grid-level data 
(Dilley 2005; Peduzzi et al. 2009) and newer conflict research has also started utilizing this 
method (Braithwaite 2005; Buhaug 2010b). Smaller units allow for more precise information 
and take into account regional variations within countries and states. This is especially 
important when assessing natural disaster vulnerability and levels of development as many 
countries exhibit rather large variations between privileged and less privileged areas as well as 
specific local conditions that will not be observed in a country level analysis. Likewise, most civil 
wars are highly local events and many have little impact on the society at large. National data 
are often poor proxies for the conditions where conflicts occur, and their use may lead to 
ecological fallacy: inferring about individual behavior from aggregate data. Grid-level data also 
has the distinct advantage of being socially exogenous as the borders of the independent grid 
cells are not determined by actors or organizations, but rather by math. This makes the 
observations more stable over time as borders and regimes change while the grid cells do not 
(Tollefsen et al. 2012).  
 
4.2.1 PRIO-GRID 
 
The main part of the data in this paper is taken from the PRIO-GRID dataset. Each grid is a 
quadratic cell on the two-dimensional terrestrial plane and the total mesh is constructed by 
using vector shapes where each cell is represented by a square polygon vector (Tollefsen et al. 
2012). Spatially, the grid adheres to the dominant geographic coordinate system (the World 
Geodesic System, WGS84) where the arcs separating the grid cells are defined at exactly 0.5 
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decimal degree intervals latitude and longitude.  The complete global grid matrix consists of 
360 rows x 720 columns, amounting to 259,200 grid cells in total (Tollefsen et al. 2012). Several 
of the control variables in this dataset are taken from the PRIO-GRID dataset as they allow us to 
more accurately find within country variation on issues such as population density and GDP per 
capita. The main dependent variable is also taken from the PRIO-GRID dataset.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Conversions of a high-resolution land cover raster to grid structure. The figure illustrates how a 
high-resolution raster (top) is represented in PRIO-GRID (below). The string codes denote different land 
cover, for example WO = woodland. Example from Tollefsen et al. (2012). 
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4.2.2 GIS procedure 
 
The variables that were not already in the PRIO-GRID dataset were converted into a GIS-format 
using the open source software Grass GIS. This was done by constructing the variables into a 
shape file that is then spatially joined together with the existing layers already provided by 
PRIO-GRID. When the layers are all combined, merged and exported they are fully usable as 
normal datasets in Stata.   
 
 
Figure 4.2: An animated overview of the areas affected by any type of flood between 1985 and 2002. 
Together with additional data from later years this formed the basis for the flood-variable in the 
disaggregated analysis.  
 
Source: (Brackenridge et al. 2009) 
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4.3 Data issues and selection bias 
 
There are several issues with the data at hand which I will all try to present in a clear manner in 
the following section. Firstly, there are several different sources of disaster data available, but 
the amount of GIS-data available is not at comparable levels. While Slettebak (2012) in his 
country-level approach to the topic utilizes the EM-DAT disaster database, the majority of its 
disaster observations lack the required spatial and longitudinal coordinates for a proper 
conversion into GIS-data (see Busch 2012 where the remaining observations from EM-DAT are 
utilized in a GIS-format). Rather than admit defeat at the hands of having too few disaster 
observations I have constructed similar variables out of other databases. The variable for 
drought is taken from the PRIO-GRID dataset itself and simply rearranged into a binominal 
variable. The flood data is taken from the Darthmouth Flood Observatory database and 
converted into a separate layer that was then spatially merged with the remaining data. This 
gives a disadvantage when comparing the results with Slettebak’s country level analysis, but I 
find it defendable given that both sources of data give reasonable results, are affiliated with 
credible institutions and have previously been utilized by other researchers (Brackenridge et al. 
2009; Theisen et al. 2011). 
There is also a large amount of data in the dataset. For many of the variables, specifically the 
dependent one, the amount of positive observations versus negative observations is very 
lopsided. This is perfectly explainable by the simple fact that civil war very rarely breaks out in 
any given grid cell compared to all the years where a given grid cell does not have an outbreak 
of civil war. However, the amount of negative observations in the dataset did provide some 
challenges when it comes to collinearity which I will address later in this chapter.  
Thirdly, the nature of a natural disaster does entail some particular issues when it comes to 
data collection. While there is a clear trend in regards to the amount and occurrence of natural 
disasters there is also the fact that reporting measures and technology have improved over the 
years. As mentioned previously, one of the conditions of a natural disaster is the fact that it 
affects humans. Naturally some of the rise in the occurrence of natural disasters could 
reasonably be explained by the fact that humans now inhabit far more areas and space than 
previously. At the same time there are qualified reasons to expect that as the economic 
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conditions of many countries have bettered since the 1950s, so have their measures of disaster 
reporting and assessment. That these kind of social factors have a profound impact on the data 
collection is highlighted by Strömberg (2007) who points out that western democracies are 
overrepresented in the data available, and that China drastically changed its reporting of 
natural disasters after a change of head of state in 1979. Likewise, the flood data from the 
Dartmouth Flood Observatory is hampered by the fact that coverage varies from nation to 
nation and that: “In general, news from floods in low-tech countries tend to arrive later and be 
less detailed than information from 'first world' countries” (DFO 2007). There isn’t however, 
many good ways of amending this problem that are within the scope of this paper. I have 
reproduced Slettebak’s (2012) country-level analysis as a comparison, but there is scant 
evidence that suggests that country-level data does not also suffer from this problem. 
 
Table 4.1: Number of disaster observations in the country-level analysis. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Storms 5829 .3920055 1.401983 0 27 
Floods 5829 .5040316 1.207756 0 20 
Droughts 5829 .0691371 .2630068 0 3 
Source: Slettebak (2012)/EM-DAT (2007) 
 
The country-level disaster-variables take into the account the amount of disaster that a given 
country has experienced during a year. The maximum for storms for example, are 27 
observations of catastrophic storms in a single year for a single country, in this case Turkey, in 
1945.   
 
Table 4.2  
Number of disaster observations in the disaggregated analysis.  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Floods_gis 1888850 .0226482 .1487792 0 1 
Droughts_gis 1737071 .1057205 .3074796 0 1 
Source: PRIO-GRID/Dartmouth Flood Observatory 
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The disaggregated data on the other hand is coded simply based on if the given grid-cell 
experienced an observation of either a catastrophic drought or a catastrophic flood in any given 
year. Given the highly dynamic nature of storms I was unable to find any source that supplied a 
satisfactory amount of data that could be utilized in a disaggregated analysis. Given the large 
discrepancies between the two types of data both of the analysis should be evaluated with 
discretion and be viewed as complementary robustness tests.  
 
4.4 Measurement Validity  
 
According to Adcock and Collier (2001) a measurement is valid when the scores derived from a 
given indicator can meaningfully be interpreted in terms of the systematized concept that the 
indicator seeks to operationalize. As the entirety of the data in this analysis is not collected by 
me I can merely advise the same discretion when interpreting the results as I myself have put 
to ground. I have provided a full description of what the different variables, their indicators and 
how they are operationalized.  
 
4.5 Dataset and unit of analysis 
 
The datasets that are utilized are the PRIO-GRID dataset and its sub-datasets such as the 
Climate and Socioeco parts of the dataset (Tollefsen 2012). Furthermore, the disaggregated 
analysis uses data from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (Brackenridge et al. 2009) and a 
variable constructed from the dataset of Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
The country-level data is a replication of Slettebak (2012) analysis and utilizes data from Fearon 
and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and the EM-DAT disaster database (CRED 2007). 
The unit of analysis is the risk of civil war developing, commonly named as civil war onset, or 
simply onset throughout many parts of this paper.  
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4.6 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable in both the country and the disaggregated models is the onset-variable 
from the UDCP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Tollefsen et al. 2012). For 
the disaggregated analysis the variable is defined as a dummy variable that identifies the grid 
cell hosting the initial battle location for each intrastate conflict (Tollefsen et al. 2012). Likewise, 
for the country-level models, the variable measures outbreak of a violent intrastate conflict 
that results in more than 25 annual battle-related deaths. However, there is an ongoing debate 
on whether it is most useful to look at conflict outbreaks or incidence:  
“Scholars disagree as to whether or not the onset of war is likely to have a different causation 
from the continuation of war. Incidence is the more reasonable measure if one is interested in 
questions of the type ‘How much conflict occurred in this period?’ or in estimates of human 
suffering or material destruction. For analyses of factors associated with patterns of violence, 
the onset of conflict may be at least as important” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 630). 
I will complement the analysis by running a model that also looks at conflict incidence, but since 
my research questions seeks answers to whether climate-related natural disasters leads to 
more conflicts, there are clear reasons to choose onset over incidence as the dependent 
variable. 
Table 4.3: A sample from the dataset that includes ten positive observations of civil war 
onset.  Included are the unique Gis-code that denotes the cell, the year the conflict started, 
the distance of the cell from the capital, the geographical coordinates and the name of the 
country. 
Gis-code Year Capdist X-coord Y-coord Country 
      
140858 1981 732 48.75 27.57 Somalia 
135925 1981 134 102.25 45.75 Malaysia 
152285 1990 1158 45.85 15.75 Mali 
160385 1991 644 92.25 21.25 Myanmar 
164708 1997 1718 93.75 24.25 India 
148928 1997 335 123.75 13.25 Philippines 
142182 2000 498 -9.25 27.60 Guinea 
149373 2000 414 -13.75 13.75 Senegal 
190482 2001 286 20.75 42.25 Serbia 
140127 2004 539 43.25 45.75 Ethiopia 
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4.7 Independent variables 
4.7.1 Climate related natural disasters 
 
The main independent variables in the disaggregated analysis are the two disaster variables. 
The first one measures droughts and is taken from the “Physclimate” section of the PRIO-GRID 
dataset. SPI6, as it is originally denoted is an aggregated yearly Standardized Precipitation Index 
that indicates within-year deviations in precipitation based on monthly data (Tollefsen 2012). 
The SPI6 data are extracted from NetCDF data provided by the International Research Institute 
for Climate and Society derived from the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre. I have 
recoded the SPI6 variable into a binominal disaster value where all observations that are 
classified as “extreme drought” is coded as a positive observation. This means a grid cell that 
has experienced at least three consecutive months of moderate drought and a minimum of two 
consecutive months of severe drought. Both of the above criteria above must be fulfilled for 
the observation to qualify as a disastrous drought in the dataset. In terms of numbers this 
means that the grid cell has experienced at least 2.5 standard deviations less precipitation than 
in a normal year.  
 
The flood disaster variable originates from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory database and has 
been converted using GIS software as previously described. Only Class 1.5 and Class 2 events 
have been included as positive observations. Class 1.5 events denotes flood events that are 
very large events: with a greater than two decades but less than 100 year estimated recurrence 
interval, and/or a local recurrence interval of at 1-2 decades and affecting a large geographic 
region that is larger than 5000 sq. km. Class 2 events are extreme flooding that has an 
estimated recurrence interval of a 100 years (DFO 2007).   
 
For the country-level analysis all the disaster-events are taken from the EM-DAT dataset and 
are classified as a natural disaster when the event fulfills at least one of the following criteria: 
ten or more people reported killed, 100 or more reported affected, a declaration of a state of 
emergency, and/or a call for international assistance (CRED 2007). In the country-level analysis 
there is also adequate data on the number of storms per year, which I have chosen to include 
in this analysis.  
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4.7.2 Control variables 
 
I have chosen control variables that are consistent with previous research in the field of what 
constitutes greater chances of a civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Hegre et al. 2012).  
 
4.7.2.1 Population 
 
Population, and population density, is deemed to be a significant factor in predicting the risk of 
a civil war outbreak. While there is evidence that population size does not affect the length of a 
conflict (Buhaug and Lujala 2005), and different opinions on whether it makes conflicts more 
severe or not (Gleditsch et al. 2009; Lacina et al. 2006), it is proven significant when 
determining risk of civil war onset:  
 
“Greater populations are associated with increased conflict risks, and a country with the 
population size of Nigeria has an estimated risk that is about three times higher than a country 
the size of Liberia.8 The increase in the risk of conflict does not increase proportionally with 
population, however—the per-capita risk of civil war onset decreases with population size. 
(Hegre et al. 2012: 255).  
 
The population variable in the disaggregated analysis is taken from the PRIO-GRID dataset, 
where it is originally coded from the Gridded Population of the World, version 3 (CIESIN 2005).  
 
4.7.2.2 Economy 
 
General levels of income or the gross domestic product per capita is also determined as a 
contributing factor when assessing risk of civil war outbreak. Higher levels of income per capita 
reduces the risk of conflict and this is a robust finding across several different and varied 
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studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch et al. 2009; Hegre et al. 
2001). There are different ways to interpret the variable as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) for 
example takes the view that GDP per capita signifies the capabilities and infrastructure of the 
state in question. Therefore a high GDP per capita may signify a content population, but could 
also (or instead) imply a state that simply has the means and resources to suppress any 
rebellion quickly and efficiently. The variable is taken from the Nordhaus G-ECON dataset and is 
the gross cell product per capita in 1995 (Nordhaus 2006). The data has been extrapolated and 
measured against the other five year intervals that are available in the dataset.  
Countries that derive a large portion of their income from petroleum exports have previously 
been found to be at a greater risk of experiencing a civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Slettebak 
2012). The data on oil exports are from the World Bank (2007) and have been expanded to 
include all cells in a given country. This may provide a slightly tilted result as some countries 
divide the money from oil exports unevenly among different provinces and regions.  
  
4.7.2.3 Terrain and distance to capital 
 
In civil wars the terrain and distance the opponents have to traverse can be vital in determining 
whether the rebel faction can sustain or even launch a campaign. Mountainous terrain and 
dense jungle often provide safe harbors for rebel militia that deters government forces from 
launching large scale operations against them, the FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan are current examples of organizations aided by these factors. In the disaggregated 
analysis I have included a mountainous variable that measures how rugged a specific cell is. The 
variable gives the proportion (i.e., average pixel value, in percent) of mountainous terrain 
within each cell. This indicator is based on high-resolution mountain raster data that were 
developed for UNEP’s Mountain Watch Report (Blyth 2002; Tollefsen 2012). The other terrain-
based variable is the given cell’s distance to the country’s capital measured in kilometers. The 
capital is determined from which country code the cell adheres to (Tollefsen 2012). 
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4.7.2.5 Regimes and stability  
 
Regime type and the age of a new state can influence its institutional stability and its risk of 
experiencing a civil war. The new state-variable is a simple dummy that determines whether 
the cell in question is located within a newly born state within a time frame of three years. The 
data comes from the Polity IV dataset and the Correlates of War Project (Marshall and Jaggers 
2006; Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Likewise the variable that measures regime stability is a 
simple dichotomy that takes into the account that regimes that range between -5 and 5 on the 
Polity IV Scale, typically anocracies, experience a higher risk of conflict (Hegre et al. 2001; 
Marshall and Jaggers 2006; Slettebak 2012). 
 
4.7.2.6 Ethnic and religious fractionalization   
 
The country-level analysis contains variables for ethnic and religious fractionalization within a 
country and are directly imported from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The variables are constructed 
by Fearon and Laitin and “consists of data from the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (ELF), 
a measure of the share of the population belonging to the largest ethnic group constructed 
from the CIA Factbook and other sources” (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 78-79). Sadly, it proved too 
large a task to construct similar variables for the disaggregated analysis, considering that the 
construction process for the original variables is not readily apparent. Cederman et al. (2009) 
utilize a disaggregated ethnicity variable for exploring ethno-nationalist civil wars on a global 
scale. I have tried to incorporate their data, but have found that the limits on the available data 
constrict the disaggregated analysis to a level that made it necessary to drop the variable in the 
final analysis. This is regrettable as it is likely an important variable and its absence should 
therefore be noted when interpreting the results.  
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4.7 Regression models 
 
I utilize the following two regression models to see if there is a significant relationship between 
climate-related natural disasters and the risk of civil war.  
For the country level analysis:  
Y(Onset) + β0 + β1(Conflict  previous year) + β2(GDP/capita, lagged) + β3(Population 
size lagged) + β4(Rough terrain) + β5(Noncontiguous state) + β6(New state) + 
β7(Instability, lagged) + β8(Level of democracy) + β9(Ethnic fractionalization) + 
β10(Religious fractionalization) + β11(Storms) + β12(Floods) + β13(Droughts) + ϵ 
For the disaggregated analysis:  
Y(Onset) + β0 + β1(Cell population, lagged) + β2(Cell GDP/capita 1995, extrapolated) + 
β3(Cell distance to Capital) + β4(Petroleum exports) + β5(Cell in New state) + β6(Rough 
terrain) + β7(Level of Democracy) + β8(Flood in cell) + β9(Drought in cell) + ϵ 
 
4.8 Statistical model  
 
I employ a statistical model where the dependent variable is in the form of a binominal value 
that differs between one and zero. I therefore utilize a binominal logistic regression model to 
explain the outcomes. 
 
4.8.1 Logistic binominal regression  
 
Standard linear regression models do not handle outlying observations in a manner that 
provide a plot that is easily translatable. Non-linear models such as the logistic binominal 
regression model which I will utilize in this paper are better at handling discrepancies in the 
data and provide an answer that is translated as the logarithmic odds of a given outcome, in 
this case the risk of civil war onset. Furthermore, when using binominal count measures such as 
the dependent variable in this case; ordinary least square (OLS) models may lead to inefficient 
and inconsistent estimates (Long and Freese 2006). A logistic model takes into account the 
heavily centered distribution of the results, which naturally are all centered either at 0 or 1. 
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4.8.2 Model specifications  
 
Because the model assumes that all observations are independent from each other, while in 
reality they are in fact not, certain measures have to be taken. Utilizing the robust option to 
compensate for violations of the assumption produces more accurate and conservative 
standard errors (Long and Freese 2006). Further using the clustering option tries to minimize 
the effect of observations that are not independent of each other, such as observations within 
the same country. Hopefully this eliminates some of the problems from having the effects of 
one civil war driving the results of another. This leads me to clustering the observations by 
country code, both in the country-level and in the disaggregated analysis. Further measures, 
such as year-dummies and random effects models are explained in Chapter 6.  
4.9 Missing data 
 
Having employed a conservative approach to the collection of the data I have eliminated the 
worst of the problems with missing data points by simply narrowing the analysis to the period 
after 1980. The disaster data turns out to be more comprehensive after 1980 and the 
previously mentioned problem with a politically motivated period of missing data from China is 
mitigated as well. In the disaggregated analysis there is a wide berth of missing data on both 
cell populations and GDP measures as there simply are no existing yearly measures on a grid-
level detail for neither of these variables. Both have been extrapolated and interpolated to 
make them viable for analysis. The variable for petroleum exports is the variable with the most 
missing observations and since it does not contribute to the disaggregated analysis I have 
removed it from my models. For the replicated analysis it is included in the same models as per 
the original. As with all data-sets of such a considerable size as the disaggregated one it is 
important to keep in mind all the potential disturbances and problems that goes into collecting 
so much data. Caution is advised when interpreting the results.   
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4.10 Summary statistics 
 
Table 4.3: Country-level summary statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Onset 4569 .033 .179 0 1 
Previous Conflict 4526 .177 .382 0 1 
GDP/cap 5268 8.274 1.194 4.094 11.558 
Population, ln 5138 8.512 2.085 2.302 14.096 
Rough terrain 4308 2.096 1.432 0 4.557 
Noncontigious 4308 .156 .363 0 1 
New state 5829 .014 .119 0 1 
Instability 4398 .129 .335 0 1 
Anocracy 4354 .236 .424 0 1 
Ethnic frac. 4308 .409 .280 .001 .925 
Religious frac. 4308 .381 .280 0 .782 
Storms 5829 .392 1.401 0 27 
Floods 5829 .504 1.207 0 20 
Drought 5829 .069 .263 0 3 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Disaggregated analysis summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Onset 1814926 .001 .011 0 1 
Cell Population 
(log)  
1688108 8.334 3.111 0 16.700 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
1716624 9.987 1.340 6.498 16.716 
Capital distance 
(log) 
1814771 7.013 1.104 0.693 8.981 
Ex. Constraints 1709505 2.432 4.557 -6 7 
New State 1815257 .003 .058 0 1 
Rough Terrain 1816202 .225 .352 0 1 
Anocracy 1789881 .187 .390 0 1 
Floods 1816094 .018 .135 0 1 
Droughts 1677172 .108 .310 0 1 
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4.11 Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity can be a problem if a certain independent variable inexplicably exerts an 
unproportionally strong influence on another independent variable. This can make it hard to 
isolate the effects of each variable on the dependent variable as the effects from both 
independent variables will appear at the same time (Skog 2005). The will results in inflated 
standard errors and insignificant relationships. By calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
of the models I am able to see if there are any worrisome effects. The mean VIF for the full 
model of my disaggregated analysis is 1.29 and the highest score is 1.74, which is far below the 
threshold for troublesome variables, which is set at 10.  For the country-level analysis the 
highest VIF-score is even lower at 1.56. Looking at the correlations in table 4.5 there are no 
variables that approach the threshold value of 0.7. In other words: Multicollinearity is not a 
problem in the analysis.  
 
Table 4.5: Cross-correlation table for the main variables in the disaggregated analysis 
 
Onset Pop/cell GDP/cell Distance Newstate  
Onset 1.0000 
    
 
Pop/cell 0.0121 1.0000 
   
 
GDP/cell -0.0091 -0.4694 1.0000 
  
 
Distance -0.0127 -0.5792 0.3516 1.0000 
 
 
Newstate 0.0064 0.0160 -0.0171 -0.0560 1.0000  
Terrain 0.0028 0.0160 -0.0406 0.1489 -0.0148  
Xconst -0.0020 -0.1690 0.4554 0.0567 -0.0363  
Drought 0.0002 -0.0060 0.0207 -0.0054 0.0034  
Flood 0.0006 0.0497 -0.0228 -0.0251 -0.0030  
  
Terrain Xpolity Drought Flood 
 
Terrain 1.0000 
   
 
Xconst -0.0597 1.0000 
  
 
Drought -0.0024 -0.0256 1.0000 
 
 
Flood 0.0083 0.0195 -0.0201 1.0000  
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5.0 Analysis  
5.1 Country level analysis 
 
The original research question of this paper is whether climate related natural disasters have 
any effect on the risk of civil war outbreak. Rune Slettebak tried answering this question in his 
2012 article “Don’t Blame the Weather: Climate Related Natural Disasters and Conflict”, and my 
country level analysis is a modified replication of his study. The country level data spans over a 
longer period of years than what is available for the disaggregated study, but for comparative 
reasons I have cut the country-level analysis down to the same time frame as the disaggregated 
analysis. This operation does not affect the results of the main variables dramatically.1 
Slettebak’s approach utilizes Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) dependent variable in the first model 
and then moves on to the onset variable from the UDCP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset in the 
following models (Gleditsch et al. 2002). In Fearon & Laitin’s baseline model the data behaves 
differently in the form of giving large explanative weight to the dummy that determines 
whether the country experienced conflict the previous year or not. In all of the other models 
the dummy turns insignificant and has little to no explanative power.  
The baseline model for the UDCP/PRIO onset variable establishes that population size and GDP 
per capita are highly significant and important drivers when determining the risks of civil war 
onset. These two variables perform well and are by far the most robust in terms of maintaining 
their significance across models and specifications. The terrain variable loses a lot of its 
significance when removing the decades from 1945-1980 and performs much better in 
Slettebak’s original analysis. It remains significant at lower levels throughout most of the 
models however and still predicts a small risk increase in the chance of a civil war starting in 
countries where the factions may utilize terrain that is hard to access.  
The noncontiguous variable actually provides explanatory power in all of the UDCP/PRIO-
models, which they do not do in Slettebak’s analysis. The variable for petroleum exporting 
countries does not perform robustly across models and is dropped after the baseline models 
                                                          
 
1 See the appendix for the full country-level analysis from 1945-2007. 
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because it strains the amount of available observations. However the dummy that takes into 
effect whether a state is newly founded performs strongly across all models and shows that 
new states have a significantly higher chance of experiencing civil war outbreaks than old states. 
The instability variable loses all explanatory power in this analysis, and performs poorly in 
Slettebak’s original analysis as well. The anocracy dummy provides significant results that 
indicate increased risk of civil war, but its explanatory value is challenged in the following grid-
level analysis. Both of the variables that measures ethnic and religious fractionalization provide 
strong results, but religious fractionalization performs better in this analysis than in the original 
results. 
Looking at the independent disaster variables Slettebak’s count measure, which simply 
measures the amount of disasters in a given country in one year, adds very little to the model. 
However, the binary dummy performs well and shows that countries that experience a natural 
disaster experience a reduction in the risk of a civil war breaking out. When categorized into 
separate variables only droughts give significant results in the original analysis, but in this 
concentrated replication it loses its significance. Slettebak introduces an interaction term 
between population and the binary disaster variable in the final model that retains some of its 
significance in this replication. Its results show that countries that have increased risk of civil 
war outbreaks because of large populations will experience a significant decrease in this type of 
risk if they experience a natural disaster.  
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Table 5.1: Country-level analysis 1980-2007 
Dependent 
variable 
(1) 
F&L onset 
(2) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset 
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset 
(6) 
Onset 
 
 
      
Conflict 
previous year 
-1.107** 
(0.463) 
-0.012 
(0.325) 
-0.138 
(0.336) 
-0.137 
(0.330) 
-0.161 
(0.336) 
-0.150 
(0.340) 
GDP/cap, 
lagged 
-0.536*** 
(0.143) 
-0.440*** 
(0.135) 
-0.512*** 
(0.146) 
-0.505*** 
(0.146) 
-0.507*** 
(0.145) 
-0.505*** 
(0.146) 
Pop. Size (ln), 
lagged 
0.260** 
(0.108) 
0.223** 
(0.082) 
0.248** 
(0.079) 
0.286*** 
(0.074) 
0.230** 
(0.082) 
0.104 
(0.123) 
Rough terrain 
 
0.180 
(0.121) 
0.151* 
(0.083) 
0.121 
(0.079) 
0.141* 
(0.078) 
0.131* 
(0.079) 
0.150* 
(0.079) 
Noncontiguous 
state 
0.757 
(0.496) 
0.755** 
(0.335) 
0.844** 
(0.362) 
0.871** 
(0.362) 
0.867** 
(0.353) 
0.781** 
(0.377) 
Oil exporter 
 
0.437 
(0.442) 
0.543* 
(0.315) 
    
New State 
 
2.572*** 
(0.626) 
1.734** 
(0.604) 
1.650** 
(0.618) 
1.620** 
(0.624) 
1.705** 
(0.624) 
1.570** 
(0.619) 
Recent 
Instability (lag) 
0.540 
(0.352) 
-0.252 
(0.259) 
-0.250 
(0.239) 
-0.234 
(0.241) 
-0.237 
(0.239) 
-0.227 
(0.242) 
Anocracy (lag)1 0.044* 
(0.026) 
0.328 
(0.264) 
0.441* 
(0.248) 
0.454* 
(0.242) 
0.417* 
(0.244) 
0.502** 
(0.250) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.407 
(0.616) 
1.459** 
(0.495) 
1.404** 
(0.487) 
1.415** 
(0.490) 
1.396** 
(0.482) 
1.386** 
(0.490) 
Religious 
fractionalization 
0.065 
(0.803) 
-0.888* 
(0.537) 
-1.049** 
(0.517) 
-1.113** 
(0.509) 
-0.988* 
(0.521) 
-1.098** 
(0.516) 
Disasters, count 
 
  -0.007 
(0.035) 
   
Disasters, 
binary 
   -0.437** 
(0.194) 
 -3.065** 
(1.529) 
Storms 
 
    -0.064 
(0.072) 
 
Floods 
 
    0.070 
(0.084) 
 
Droughts 
 
    -0.482 
(0.304) 
 
Disaster * 
Population 
     0.278* 
(0.162) 
 
 
      
Constant 
 
-6.073*** 
(1.121) 
-3.325** 
(1.353) 
-2.795** 
(1.412) 
-3.090** 
(1.399) 
-2.661* 
(1.427) 
-1.462 
(1.589) 
 
 
      
Observations 
 
2744 3224 3734 3734 3734 3734 
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.144 0.133 0.137 0.139 0.140 
1 Model 1: score on Polity IV scale; all other models: anocracy dummy. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) original dependent variable is used in Model 1, while the dependent variable in the other 
models is from UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006). All models but the 
original one from Fearon & Laitin are run with robust standard errors and year-fixed effects (year dummies not 
shown). 
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5.2 Disaggregated analysis 
 
The disaggregated analysis is my own and therefore it is subjected to several alterations 
compared to the replication of Slettebak’s country level analysis. The baseline model contains 
most of the variables from the country level analysis but the variables for petroleum exporting 
countries, noncontiguous borders and previous instability are omitted because they do not 
contribute to the analysis in a significant manner. I was unable to reproduce cell-based versions 
of the variables for ethnic and religious fractionalization. Successful attempts have been made 
by Cederman et al. (2009) for measuring the effects of marginalized groups by using center—
periphery dyads and the results indicate a significant increase of risk for ethnic civil wars in 
dyads with marginalized groups. It should be noted that an ethnic 
fractionalization/marginalization variable would have contributed to this analysis.  
Another important difference from Slettebak’s replication is that I have chosen to lag the 
dependent variable by one year in the standard models. I have taken this measure because I 
find it more plausible that social effects like resource deprivation, desperation and aggression 
that that stem from a natural disaster will need time to grow into fully fledged conflicts. I have 
provided models that lag the onset variable by additional years and have also included an 
incidence model for comparison.   
The baseline model provides highly significant and expected results for all the main variables. 
The risk of civil war increases with population size and decreases with a higher gross domestic 
product per capita. The results for these two variables continue to stay consistent and reliable 
throughout all of the models in the cell-based analysis. The log-transformed variable that 
measures the distance from the cell to the country’s capital is also highly significant and shows 
that the risk of a civil war onset in a cell decreases the further away from the capital the cell is 
located. This finding is consistent with the fact that many of the opening battles of a civil war 
erupt close to or even in the capital itself. The variable that measures mountainous and 
inaccessible terrain does not perform well throughout the models and is only slightly significant 
in the baseline model.  
The second model adds the anocracy dummy from the country level analysis that is based on 
the PolityIV scale. I have also included a democracy dummy from PolityIV for comparison. 
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However, the PolityIV scale is arguably a flawed measure when it is used as an independent 
variable in conflict onset scenarios. James Vreeland (2008) shows that the composition of the 
PolityIV scale uses variables that themselves captures the effects of civil war and violence. He 
concludes that “Using this variable to test the relationship between regime and civil war is 
tantamount to tautology” (Vreeland 2008: 7). To alleviate the problems with the PolityIV scale I 
instead opt to use the solution from Koubi et al. (2012) where the “Constraints on Chief 
Executive (XCONST)” variable is used instead of the full PolityIV scale. Predicted and shown by 
Vreeland, the effects from the PolityIV scale disappears once these steps are employed. The 
same is true for the quadrated version of the variable.  
Model 3 adds the disaster variables to the equation and provides results that are similar to the 
country level analysis in terms of the lack of any significance. Neither floods nor droughts add 
any explanatory power to the analysis. The next model also disputes Slettebak’s significant 
findings for a binary disaster variable.  
However when lagging the dependent onset variable further, respectively by two and three 
years in model 5 and 6, the results change dramatically. While the main control variables stay 
consistent with the other models the result for the drought variable turns significant at the 95 
percent level. The models state that the odds of a civil war breaking out in a cell that 
experienced catastrophic drought increase with 1.83 two years after the drought and 1.63 
three years after the drought. In other words: Two years after a cell experienced drought it has 
nearly double the chance of a civil war erupting than a cell that did not experience a drought 
two years prior. The effect is driven by the fact that the dataset only contains a total of 186 
conflict onsets in the total time period. Nearly 18 percent of all conflict onsets in the dataset 
happened in a cell that had experienced a drought two years prior (see table 5.3). Examples of 
matches include cells in Burundi, Angola, and Liberia all during the middle part of the 1990s. 
The majority of the matches stem from the Sahel-region, but Pakistan, India and Thailand are 
also present. The flood-variable remains insignificant throughout both of the models as there 
where only seven and eight matches, respectively, for cells that experienced a civil war onset 
two and three years after a major flood. Also of note is the fact that the variable for new states 
becomes obsolete when the onset variable is lagged three years.  
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Table 5.2: Grid-level analysis 1980-2007 
Dependent 
variable 
(1) 
Onseta 
(2) 
Onseta 
(3) 
Onseta 
(4) 
Onseta 
(5) 
Onseta 
(6) 
Onsetb 
(7) 
Onsetc 
 
 
       
Cell population 
(log) 
0.471*** 
(0.081) 
0.503*** 
(0.077) 
0.487*** 
(0.092) 
0.478*** 
(0.090) 
0.479*** 
(0.089) 
0.486*** 
(0.090) 
0.477*** 
(0.091) 
Cell-GDP/cap 
(log) 
-0.508*** 
(0.108) 
-0.492*** 
(0.135) 
-0.521*** 
(0.157) 
-0.547*** 
(0.143) 
-0.554*** 
(0.143) 
-0.558*** 
(0.143) 
-0.545*** 
(0.142) 
Distance to 
Capital (log) 
-0.616*** 
(0.158) 
-0.553*** 
(0.147) 
-0.562*** 
(0.165) 
-0.571*** 
(0.163) 
-0.575*** 
(0.162) 
-0.591*** 
(0.163) 
-0.609*** 
(0.169) 
Cell is part of a 
new state 
2.252*** 
(0.554) 
2.424*** 
(0.497) 
2.286*** 
(0.621) 
2.315*** 
(0.626) 
2.310*** 
(0.626) 
1.931*** 
(0.612) 
d 
Rough Terrain 
 
0.656* 
(0.346) 
0.658* 
(0.376) 
0.598 
(0.409) 
0.616 
(0.407) 
0.608 
(0.407) 
0.549 
(0.417) 
0.603 
(0.420) 
Anocracy  
 
 0.918*** 
(0.329) 
     
Democracy 
 
 0.486 
(0.337) 
     
Xconst  
 
  0.057 
(0.047) 
0.023 
(0.041) 
0.024 
(0.041) 
0.035 
(0.042) 
0.033 
(0.044) 
Xconst2 
 
  -0.011 
(0.009) 
    
Drought in cell  
 
  0.130 
(0.256) 
 0.609** 
(0.285) 
0.492** 
(0.250) 
Flood in cell 
 
   -0.021 
(0.513) 
 0.012 
(0.408) 
0.437 
(0.491) 
Disasters, 
binary 
 
    0.055 
(0.264) 
  
 
 
       
Constant 
 
-6.042*** 
(1.922) 
-7.235*** 
(2.108) 
-6.269*** 
(2.411) 
-6.109*** 
(2.362) 
-6.028** 
(2.356) 
-6.090*** 
(2.297) 
-5.975*** 
(2.306) 
 
 
       
Observations 
 
1 571 991 1 554 690 1 418 959 1 414 264 1 481 959 1 359 701 1 299 685 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.147 0.153 0.143 0.139 0.142 0.142 0.139 
a Lagged one year 
b Lagged two years  
c Lagged three years 
d Omitted because 0 explains failure perfectly 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
All models with robust standard errors (country clusters). 
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Table 5.3 Tabulation of conflict onsets and droughts 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Summary 
 
Overall the country-level analysis performs as expected and shows a reduction in the risk of civil 
war outbreaks if a country suffers a climate-related natural disaster that same year. However, 
this finding is only consistent when utilizing Slettebak’s binary disaster variable. The main 
control variables for population and gross national product per capita perform well and 
produce results that are plausible and consistent with several other studies (Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Hegre et al. 2012). Fearon and Laitin’s control variable that 
measures if the rebels have access to an area that does not share borders with the country in 
question turns relevant in this analysis, but it is driven by a very small number (9) of positive 
observations. The main bulk consists of three conflicts in post-Soviet Russia and two 
insurgencies in Kashmir during the 1980s. Indonesia and Papau New Guinea also features as 
positive observations because Fearon and Laitin (2003) coded the variable so that more than 
100 kilometers of open sea between the belligerents constitutes as a positive observation. In 
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general, the low number of total conflict onsets during the period necessitates a lot of caution 
when interpreting the results.  
In the disaggregated analysis the main control variables continue to perform as expected and 
provide very similar results to the country level analysis. The variable that measures distance to 
the capital shows that the majority of conflicts after 1980 had their initial battle close to the 
capital city. Over 25 percent of the onsets happened less than 100 kilometers from the capital 
in question, examples being the Second Congo War which is coded as starting with the battle to 
secure Kinshasa International Airport. As mentioned in the previous section, when taken into 
account, Vreeland’s (2008) critique of the PolityIV scale makes it lose its explanatory power. 
Clearly, the most interesting finding is the fact that cells struck by droughts experience a much 
higher risk of hosting the initial battle of a conflict more than one year later. There are however, 
numerous reasons to temper the expectations as to what these findings signify, as I will try to 
explain in the coming chapter and the conclusion.   
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6.0 Robustness and model fit 
 
6.1 Mixed-effects and outliers 
 
I have tried to be as clear as possible in regards to the procedural steps taken in the analysis. To 
further prove that the models are thoroughly robust I have run the complete set of models with 
fixed effects and random effects as well as year dummies and country dummies2. This is done 
to make sure that there is no single year or country that is unbalancing the results from the 
analysis.  
I have utilized the mixed effects measure when looking at my own disaggregated model. 
Repeated measures models, such as this one, “usually include an underlying “functional” 
relationship between at least one of the predictor variables and the observations within 
individuals” (or countries, as in this analysis) (Lindstrom and Bates 1990: 3). Mixed effects 
models for repeated measures data are popular because their flexible covariance structure 
allows for nonconstant correlation among the observations and/or unbalanced data. Running 
the models with mixed effects confirms that the results from the analysis are robust, and more 
specifically that no single country is unbalancing the results.  Furthermore, looking at the 
dfbetaes for the variables and Cook’s distance-calculations there are no observations that come 
close to approach the critical thresholds. This provides added insurance that none of the 
observations are highly influential outliers that distort the inferences gathered from the 
analysis.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
2 Complete figures and tables can be found in the appendix. 
[51] 
 
 
Table 6.1: Grid-level analysis 1980-2007, all models with mixed-effects  
Dependent 
variable 
(1) 
Onseta 
(2) 
Onseta 
(3) 
Onseta 
(4) 
Onseta 
(5) 
Onseta 
(6) 
Onsetb 
(7) 
Onsetc 
 
 
       
Cell population 
(log) 
0.642*** 
(0.071) 
0.643*** 
(0.072) 
0.660*** 
(0.076) 
0.651*** 
(0.076) 
0.660*** 
(0.076) 
0.662*** 
(0.790) 
 
Cell-GDP/cap 
(log) 
-0.576*** 
(0.129) 
-0.567*** 
(0.131) 
-0.519*** 
(0.150) 
-0.595*** 
(0.143) 
-0.609*** 
(0.145) 
-0.619*** 
(0.145) 
 
Distance to 
Capital (log) 
-0.248*** 
(0.098) 
-0.248** 
(0.100) 
-0.198* 
(0.105) 
-0.219** 
(0.105) 
-0.205* 
(0.105) 
-0.248** 
(0.106) 
 
Cell is part of a 
new state 
1.767*** 
(0.467) 
1.685*** 
(0.557) 
1.547*** 
(0.524) 
1.726*** 
(0.510) 
1.714*** 
(0.510) 
1.250** 
(0.586) 
 
Rough Terrain 
 
0.932*** 
(0.251) 
0.960*** 
(0.254) 
0.956*** 
(0.272) 
0.944*** 
(0.270) 
0.946*** 
(0.271) 
0.879*** 
(0.281) 
 
Anocracy  
 
 0.761*** 
(0.222) 
     
Democracy 
 
 0.464* 
(0.260) 
     
Xconst  
 
  0.092** 
(0.040) 
0.032 
(0.030) 
0.034 
(0.030) 
0.051* 
(0.031) 
 
Xconst2 
 
  -0.025** 
(0.010) 
    
Drought in cell    
 
0.169 
(0.268) 
 0.668*** 
(0.233) 
 
Flood in cell 
 
   -0.065 
(0.509) 
 -0.027 
(0.510) 
 
Disasters, 
binary 
 
    0.078 
(0.248) 
  
 
 
       
Constant 
 
-9.879*** 
(1.729) 
-10.29*** 
(1.745) 
-10.63*** 
(1.925) 
-10.19*** 
(1.907) 
-10.27*** 
(1.921) 
-10.05*** 
(1.935) 
 
 
 
       
Observations 
 
1 571 991 1 554 690 1 481 959 1 414 264 1 481 959 1 359 701  
Wald chi2 
 
193.44 201.70 168.68 162.16 163.04 165.64  
a Lagged one year 
b Lagged two years  
c Omitted because of failure to converge 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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6.2 ROC-plots 
 
A traditional approach to quantitative studies of civil wars suggests testing the statistical 
significance of the theoretically interesting variables. If one or more are found to be significant, 
it is usually interpreted as a sign that one has advanced a step closer to discerning the logic of 
civil war. In “The Perils of Policy by p-value” Ward et al. (2010) dispute this common approach 
because they find that  studies that have lots of significant variables such as Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do a poor job of actually correctly predicting civil war. 
Even at the lowest probability threshold Fearon and Latin’s study only correctly predicts 15 out 
of 107 conflicts in the study, and that comes at the cost of 66 false positive predictions (Ward 
et al. 2010). To see if this holds true for my own study I utilize a Receiver Operator 
Characteristic (ROC) plot, which illustrates the relationship between the rate of false positives 
and the rate of true positives. In an ideal case, a perfectly predictive model will correctly 
identify all actual cases of civil war and never generate false positives. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a model with no predictive power whatsoever would, on average, generate one 
incorrect prediction for every correct prediction at all thresholds (Ward et al. 2010). The area 
under the ROC-curve is usually a good measure for this, the highest value being 1.0 (a model 
that predicts every conflict without any false positives) and the lowest being 0.5 (same number 
of correct and incorrect predictions. Running ROC-plots for all the models shows that the 
predictive power of the disaggregated analysis stays at an overall excellent level (any results 
above 0.9). It is worth noting however that the baseline model predicts better than the final 
model. The country-level replication turns in mediocre scores, an almost perfect 0.76 across all 
models.    
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Table 6.2: ROC-plot results for all models in the country-level analysis 
Model Area under ROC-curve 
(1) 0.7601 
(2) 0.7686 
(3) 0.7635 
(4) 0.7651 
(5) 0.7686 
(6) 0.7681 
 
 
Table 6.3: ROC-plot results for all models in the disaggregated analysis 
Model Area under ROC-curve 
(1) 0.9024 
(2) 0.9139 
(3) 0.9042 
(4) 0.8984 
(5) 0.9034 
(6) 0.8991 
(7) 0.9001 
 
6.3 Conflict incidence  
 
As discussed earlier it is possible to measure civil war not by onset, but instead by incidence, 
meaning that a cell which experienced conflict turns positive. Running the full set of models 
utilizing a one year lagged measure of conflict incidence in the cell naturally shows some major 
discrepancies compared to the other models (see the full table in the appendix). The GDP 
variable nearly doubles its effect and both the new state and the distance to capital variable 
lose their significance. For this paper the most important finding is that the flood disaster 
variable turns significant and predicts almost a doubling in the risk of there being a conflict in a 
cell that experienced a flood one year prior. Five percent of all the conflict incidences in the 
dataset happened in a cell that had experienced a major flooding the year before.  
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7.0 Results and Discussion  
7.1 Hypotheses  
 
My motivation for writing this thesis was to try to answer a question I feel there are wildly 
differing opinions on, especially considering the wide gap between the public perception and 
the consensus of the scientific community. As I have tried to explain straightforwardly in the 
previous sections there are many reasons as to why this is a challenging task from a statistic 
perspective, but statistic technicalities aside I will now try to put my findings into the theoretic 
framework developed earlier. First let us sum up the answers to the hypothesis presented in 
the introduction:  
H1) Climate-related natural disasters do no not provide an immediate increase in the risk 
of a conflict breaking out in the affected area.  
 
I have found limited proof for my first hypothesis from the first four models in the grid-level 
analysis and the results from the country-level replication. There does not appear to be any 
significant relationship between climate-related natural disasters and the immediate risk of 
conflict. The country level analysis goes even further and finds a negative relationship between 
natural disasters and the immediate risk of conflict. This follows Slettebak’s original findings and 
lends approval to Charles E Fritz and Williams (1957) theories of people pulling together and 
forming bands of “fellow strugglers” when catastrophe hits.   
 
H2) Negative impact from climate-related natural disasters will provide a long term 
increase in the risk of conflict in the affected area.  
 
I have found a statistically significant effect that shows that areas that experience catastrophic 
periods of droughts gain a higher risk of hosting the outbreak of a conflict in two to three years 
after the drought. This does not corroborate with previous literature and I will go into greater 
detail on the results in the next section.   
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H3) Climate-related natural disasters do not provide country-wide effects for the risk of a 
civil war onset.  
 
The country level analysis finds an immediate negative relationship between climate-related 
natural disasters and the risk of conflict onset. Further testing with increasing lag finds no 
significant relationship between the variables. This answer fits with the consensus of the field 
when it comes to climate change and conflict (Buhaug 2010a; Theisen et al. 2011; Wischnath 
and Buhaug 2014). 
 
7.2 Behind the numbers 
 
My original thesis was that climate-related natural disasters so far have yet to have any real 
impact on the potential risk of a civil war breaking out. The choice of a disaggregated analysis 
was made to further prove that when divided into geographic cells, any effects found in a 
country-level analysis, would be even less pronounced and relevant. The finding that cells 
which experience catastrophic droughts are much more likely to see a conflict breaking out two 
or three years later therefore came as a slight surprise. The question is whether this is a 
structural or systematic finding, or if it can be explained in other ways? 
Going back to Thomas Homer-Dixon (2010) and his models there is a compelling narrative that 
lends itself to the numbers previously discussed. Homer-Dixon’s model (see Figure 2.1), and 
revised versions of his original one (see Figure 2.2), all contain a logical amount of time-span 
within them. If a natural disaster leads to resource scarcity, which again leads to insecurity and 
social fragmentation, to finally end up at an increase in motivation and opportunity for 
instigating violence, there should have to be some time allowed for these processes to evolve 
and develop. As the numbers from the disaggregated analysis show, there is no effect of either 
droughts or floods within the same year or the year after these natural disasters have taken 
place. This seems to fit well given how the theoretic model predicts the effects from natural 
disasters to manifest.  
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That being said let us look closer at some of the matching cases that make up our results. 
Starting with Asia 4 of the 29 matches come from India: one stems from religious disputes in 
the early nineties, the other three are all from the Indian-sponsored rebel groups operating on 
the border of Myanmar (formerly Burma). Papua New Guinea is registered with the 
Bougainville civil war from 1991, Iraq registers with a 1997 observation from the fighting in the 
Kurdish part of the country and Iran registers twice because of attacks from the Mojahedin-e-
Khalq at the end of the nineties. Azerbaijan also registers with the 1995 Azeri coup d’état 
attempt in Baku.  
Moving on to the Americas, Haiti contributes two matches, both from the 1991 coup d’état and 
the following UN peace keeping mission. Suriname also registers a single observation from the 
guerilla war between the Maroons and the government in 1988. In Africa Gambia registers with 
Kukoi Sanyang’s rebellion in 1981, Ethiopia with the border skirmishes in 1998 and Angola with 
a single observation in 2000 at the end of its long civil war. Burundi comes with three 
observations, all from 1990s and all of them from the devastating ethnic clashes between the 
Hutus and the Tutsis. A failed coup attempt in the Comoros islands and a single observation 
from the Algerian civil war make up the last of the observations from Africa. Europe contributes 
three observations from Slovenia, Romania and Moldova as a heavy drought at the start of the 
1990s correlates with conflict observations from the start of the collapse of Yugoslavia.  
The point of this extensive listing is to say that of all the 29 positive correlations there is only 
one case where droughts are actually mentioned as a contributing factor in the literature. In 
1983 Nigeria, on a very short notice, deported up to one million Ghanaian and other African 
immigrants to Ghana while the country was in the midst of facing severe droughts and wildfires 
(Berry 1995). The conflict observation in the dataset is however attributed to the coup d’état 
attempt by Ekow Dennis and Edward Adjei-Ampofo against then president Jerry John Rawlings. 
Ghana did experience severe economic inflation, famine and adverse social conditions because 
of the droughts, but proclaiming a direct linkage between this and a military coup d’état is 
tendentious at best without a more in-depth study of the conflict. On the other part of the 
spectrum are the observations from Europe, where there is ample evidence that the fall of 
Yugoslavia was not brought about by droughts in Slovenia.  
[57] 
 
 
Several of the conflicts seem to be partly explained by the missing ethnicity variable, which with 
an educated guess should have turned out at least as relevant as in the country level analysis. 
However, even though most of the conflicts in question are driven by ethnic divides and 
independency struggles there is something to be said for the time at which they trigger. Both 
types of conflict are usually based on longstanding divides and issues, for example; the Kurds 
have fought for their own state since the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the start of the 20th 
century. That it appears to be a higher risk of fighting breaking out after droughts might be 
spurred by the effects of increased resource competition and a general sense of desperation 
and deprivation that makes launching a campaign all the more pressing or opportune at that 
moment of time.  
While the listing of all the conflict matches at first glance might seem like an argument against 
the theoretical model, given that none of them appear to be specifically about climate-change 
at first glance, the majority still fit into the theoretical framework. Nearly all of the conflicts are 
based in weak states that have poor infrastructure and suffer from a lack of institutional 
capability and stability. Per the theoretical assumptions these are the most likely cases to be 
affect by the effects of increased resource scarcity stemming from climate change. There is 
however the classic conundrum of the chicken and the egg: States that have economic 
instability and institutional weakness are more prone to suffer climate-related natural 
disasters3. E.g. while climate-related natural disasters may weaken the resilience of a state, 
weakened states are already more likely to be affected more severely and more often (Busch 
2012).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
3 Keep in mind that vulnerability, not only location and exposure, defines a natural disaster (see chapter 2.2).  
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8.0 Conclusions 
 
8.1 Summary  
 
This paper has tried to look closer at the links between climate change and civil conflict by 
utilizing different data on climate-related natural disasters and civil wars. I have tried to 
thoroughly explain that there are ample reasons to interpret these results with caution and the 
mindset that they do not constitute any kind of final say, rather a simple indication that there is 
reason for further inquiries and thought. Climate-related natural disasters will probably 
manifest themselves as important factors in conflict-research in the coming years, but their 
effect will most likely be noticed not through their direct impact, but rather through the 
negative effects they have on more important and significant variables such as economy and 
infrastructure. What we do now is that climate-related natural disasters are more likely to 
become stronger and more frequent, which could lead to their effects becoming more 
pronounced and independent.   
One important factor that this thesis is unable to take into account is the difference in how 
people will react to what is perceived to be a single random natural disaster and how they will 
react towards a disaster that is perceived to be one of a chain of recurring climate-related 
disasters. If climate-related natural disasters become seen as the product of human actions, 
they may also cause a completely different reaction than what natural disasters do today. 
Anger, condemnation and frustration towards governments that fail to shield their population 
from the effects may be worse than what it today if disasters become viewed as a systemic 
failure rather than as random acts by nature. This could further pronounce the effects from the 
theoretical model of Homer-Dixon.  
What the disaggregated analysis from this paper tells us is that there are reasons to worry even 
more for those that already have reasons to worry about the future: Weak states that have 
areas that are prone to suffer droughts may experience that the same area becomes a hotbed 
for civil conflict in the years following the drought. Even though it does not register as a valid 
case in the dataset, the complex Darfur-conflict may serve as a an example or likely case of the 
kind of conflict that the analysis predicts may become more common if the occurrence of 
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droughts continue to rise: A type of conflict that involves a failed state, ethnic divides and with 
the backdrop of competition for renewable resources like drinking water and arable land 
(Mohamed 2013). Like Homer-Dixon predicts, this analysis also finds that traditional variables 
that reflect state capability are more robust and more important than climate impact, but that 
the added stress may be final straw that breaks the camel’s back. Of importance is the fact that 
the analysis finds no correlation between floods and conflict outbreak, which draws the 
theoretical model into question depending on how you interpret it. One could argue that 
droughts simply fit the theoretical model better and have a stronger negative impact on the 
amount of available resources; a more critical view would see the findings as prone to random 
coincidences considering the model tries to incorporate resource scarcity as a whole, and not 
specific disasters.   
Furthermore the findings from the disaggregated analysis are not repeated, but partly reversed 
in the country-level analysis, providing more ground for caution in the interpretation. There is 
no evidence in the analysis that suggests that countries as a whole are more prone to host a 
civil war in the aftermath of a climate-related natural disaster, but rather that there is a slight 
decrease in the risk immediately following a disaster. The disaggregated model fits better and 
predicts better than the country-level analysis however, suggesting that an increase in the level 
of detail is advantageous when studying these types of phenomena.  
 
8.2 Further research and policy implications 
 
There are many avenues for further research that present themselves at the end of this thesis. 
The biggest hurdle of all is effectively isolating the effect of climate change upon the risk of 
conflict. Even though this thesis has tried, there is still a long way to go before one can more 
decisively determine which effects that stems from climate-change and which do not. Better 
data is of course key in this area; bigger samples, more detail and of course longer periods than 
just thirty years. A longer and more robust causal chain is also highly beneficial as trying to 
discern which variables are influenced by which. More detailed case studies like Benjaminsen et 
al. (2012) will also pave the way for being able to make better inferences based on statistical 
evidence. Interesting projects are already well under way like Gilmore et al’s (2013)  attempt to 
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modify Hegre et al’s (2012) predictive model for civil conflict to include climate-change. I think 
the coming years will see great improvement and expansion in the possibility to model the 
effects of climate-change in general.  
If there only policy implication that should be taken from this analysis it is the fact that the 
parts of the world that are at risk of hosting an armed conflict will be at an even higher risk in 
the future. That the burden of climate-change will not be shared evenly among the countries of 
the world has already been addressed several times by others, especially the IPCC which states 
in one of its latest summary for policymakers that:  
“Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and 
communities in countries at all levels of development. Risks are already moderate because of 
regionally differentiated climate-change impacts on crop production in particular”  
 (IPCC 2013: 11). 
The areas that are defined as the most likely to be hit the hardest are tropical rural areas that 
are already underdeveloped (IPCC 2013: 15-19). This prediction already fits well with the results 
from the disaggregated analysis where the majority of the conflict onsets that happened in cells 
hit by droughts were tropical areas in the Sahel, south-east Asia and Central America. It is 
important to note that the IPCC c takes a moderate view when commenting on the linkage 
between climate change and violent conflict. The chapter that is devoted to Africa specially 
answers this question in the following way: “Violent conflict are based on a variety of 
interconnected causes, of which the environment is considered to be one, but rarely the most 
decisive factor” (IPCC 2014: 50). 
Like the IPCC I to do not find that this thesis has any basis to say anything more conclusive than 
that environment is a factor, but clearly not the most decisive one, when evaluating the risk of 
violent conflict. I do find that the analysis however has given further indications to the fact that 
the world community should immediately begin to make a framework for how to alleviate the 
areas that will be hit the hardest from the effects of climate change. I appeal to a sense of 
solidarity that seems necessary if the differences between the rich and the poor are not to 
become even more pronounced when a new type of climate will bring further distress to those 
that occupy the bottom tier. It is also of vital importance that the relative positive forecast from 
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conflict research that predicts a further reduction in the number of conflicts and number of 
people killed in battle hinges on the notion that more and more people will be brought away 
from poverty (Hegre et al. 2012). Setbacks in the form of an increase in the number of climate-
related nature disasters and sudden reductions in livelihood will likely affect these predictions 
in a negative way that may paint a slightly less optimistic picture of the future.  
The answers to these challenges are complicated and require a lot more space than what is 
available here. This thesis concludes that more research hopefully will bring an even more 
detailed account of the risk that climate change constitutes to everyone, but especially that 
those that are in need already are readily identified and that measures are taken now, rather 
than when it is too late act.  Climate change has already started and in this case it is better not 
wait for conclusive evidence as to what the exact consequences will be.   
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Appendix 
 
In the appendix you will find a complete replication of Slettebak’s country level analysis (Table A.1) with 
all years included. A full grid-level model run with conflict incidence in the cell instead of conflict onset 
as the main dependent variable (Table A.2). A full overview of the year dummies from the final models 
of the country-level and grid-level analysis (Table A.3 and A.4). And finally descriptive statistics, cross 
tabulations and ROC-Plots (Table A5-8). 
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Table A.1: Complete country-level analysis 1945-2007 
Dependent 
variable 
(1) 
F&L onset 
(2) 
Onset 
(3) 
Onset 
(4) 
Onset 
(5) 
Onset 
(6) 
Onset 
 
 
      
Conflict 
previous year 
-0.954*** 
(0.314) 
-0.047 
(0.263) 
-0.132 
(0.268) 
-0.115 
(0.259) 
-0.153 
(0.269) 
-0.151 
(0.270) 
GDP/cap, 
lagged 
-0.343*** 
(0.071) 
-0.410*** 
(0.086) 
-0.449*** 
(0.095) 
-0.441*** 
(0.094) 
-0.452*** 
(0.095) 
-0.445*** 
(0.095) 
Pop. Size (ln), 
lagged 
0.262*** 
(0.072) 
0.242*** 
(0.059) 
0.240*** 
(0.052) 
0.284*** 
(0.056) 
0.231*** 
(0.055) 
0.154** 
(0.075) 
Rough terrain 
 
0.218** 
(0.084) 
0.134** 
(0.063) 
0.108* 
(0.062) 
0.124** 
(0.060) 
0.113* 
(0.062) 
0.133** 
(0.068) 
Noncontiguous 
state 
0.443 
(0.273) 
0.298 
(0.231) 
0.340 
(0.259) 
0.387 
(0.253) 
0.346 
(0.255) 
0.338 
(0.257) 
Oil exporter 
 
0.857*** 
(0.279) 
0.539** 
(0.254) 
    
New State 
 
1.709*** 
(0.338) 
1.323*** 
(0.353) 
1.292*** 
(0.357) 
1.298*** 
(0.359) 
1.294*** 
(0.356) 
1.245*** 
(0.352) 
Recent 
Instability (lag) 
0.617** 
(0.235) 
0.165 
(0.192) 
0.117 
(0.188) 
0.125 
(0.189) 
0.121 
(0.189) 
0.143 
(0.190 
Anocracy (lag)1 0.021 
(0.016) 
0.419** 
(0.189) 
0.505** 
(0.185) 
0.493** 
(0.181) 
0.490** 
(0.184) 
0.532*** 
(0.183) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.166 
(0.373) 
1.079*** 
(0.322) 
1.133*** 
(0.185) 
1.143*** 
(0.328) 
1.126** 
(0.321) 
1.138*** 
(0.321) 
Religious 
fractionalization 
0.285 
(0.508) 
-0.510 
(0.443) 
-0.703* 
(0.415) 
-0.758* 
(0.410) 
-0.661 
(0.421) 
-0.769* 
(0.412) 
Disasters, count 
 
  0.016 
(0.032 ) 
   
Disasters, 
binary 
   -0.333** 
(0.161) 
 -2.908*** 
(0.997) 
Storms 
 
    -0.027 
(0.052) 
 
Floods 
 
    0.092 
(0.065) 
 
Droughts 
 
    -0.554** 
(0.267) 
 
Disaster * 
Population 
     0.263** 
(0.099) 
 
 
      
Constant 
 
-6.731*** 
(0.735) 
-5.311*** 
(1.449) 
-4.954*** 
(1.434) 
-5.442*** 
(1.435) 
-4.862*** 
(1.433) 
-4.260*** 
(1.494) 
 
 
      
Observations 
 
6327 6444 6954 6954 6954 6954 
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.118 0.113 0.115 0.117 0.118 
1 Model 1: score on Polity IV scale; all other models: anocracy dummy. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) original dependent variable is used in Model 1, while the dependent variable in the other 
models is from UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006). All models but the 
original one from Fearon & Laitin are run with robust standard errors and year-fixed effects (year dummies not 
shown). 
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Table 5.2: Grid-level analysis 1980-2007 with conflict incidence in cell as dependent variable 
Dependent 
variable 
(1) 
Incidencea 
(2) 
Incidencea 
(3) 
Incidencea 
(4) 
Incidencea 
(5) 
Incidencea 
(6) 
Incidenceb 
(7) 
Incidencec 
 
 
       
Cell population 
(log) 
0.273** 
(0.122) 
0.289** 
(0.113) 
0.252*** 
(0.089) 
0.240*** 
(0.091) 
0.240*** 
(0.088) 
0.235*** 
(0.089) 
0.231*** 
(0.089) 
Cell-GDP/cap 
(log) 
-0.737*** 
(0.154) 
-0.745*** 
(0.154) 
-0.907*** 
(0.188) 
-0.932*** 
(0.174) 
-0.940*** 
(0.173) 
-0.920*** 
(0.173) 
-0.915*** 
(0.172) 
Distance to 
Capital (log) 
-0.223 
(0.236) 
-0.180 
(0.213) 
-0.248 
(0.197) 
-0.257 
(0.196) 
-0.260 
(0.193) 
-0.263 
(0.194) 
-0.274 
(0.193) 
Cell is part of a 
new state 
-0.639 
(0.671) 
-0.707 
(0.752) 
-0.925 
(0.770) 
-0.908 
(0.756) 
-0.868 
(0.758) 
-0.904 
(0.741) 
-0.711 
(1.060) 
Rough Terrain 
 
0.104 
(0.393) 
0.179 
(0.367) 
0.253 
(0.355) 
0.237 
(0.355) 
0.238 
(0.354) 
0.222 
(0.357) 
0.236 
(0.357) 
Anocracy  
 
 0.758* 
(0.458) 
     
Democracy 
 
 0.514 
(0.362) 
     
Xconst  
 
  0.161** 
(0.073) 
0.111* 
(0.065) 
0.114* 
(0.064) 
0.104 
(0.065) 
0.097 
(0.065) 
Xconst2 
 
  -0.015 
(0.017) 
    
Drought in cell  
 
  -0.022 
(0.106) 
 -0.115 
(0.102) 
-0.157 
(0.118) 
Flood in cell 
 
   0.614*** 
(0.100) 
 0.468*** 
(0.131) 
0.350** 
(0.152) 
Disasters, 
binary 
 
    0.109 
(0.084) 
  
 
 
       
Constant 
 
2.349 
(2.709) 
1.647 
(2.495) 
4.294* 
(2.263) 
4.420* 
(2.319) 
4.511* 
(2.297) 
4.343* 
(2.296) 
4.499** 
(2.277) 
 
 
       
Observations 
 
1 571 991 1 554 690 1 418 959 1 414 264 1 481 959 1 359 701 1 305 109 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.205 0.218 0.236 0.227 0.233 0.222 0.219 
a Lagged one year 
b Lagged two years  
c Lagged three years 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
All models with robust standard errors (country clusters). 
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Year dummies 
 
Table A.3: Complete list of years dummies for the final model (6) of the country level analysis. 
Year  Coef         Std.E 
1981  .285  .729 
1982  .321  .728 
1983  -.609  .907 
1984  -.214  .817 
1986  -.202  .812 
1987  -.162  .684 
1989  1.333**  .610 
1990  1.225*  .659 
1991  1.469**  .603 
1992  .417*  .722 
1993  .806  .667 
1994  .444  .725 
1995  -.652  .938 
1996  .491  .720 
1997  .878  .696 
1998  .383  .731 
1999  .132  .752 
2000  .413  .645 
2001  .230  .781 
2002  -.036  .819 
2003  -.040  .858 
2004  .487  .727 
2005  .566  .742 
2006  .336  .772 
2007  .891  .732 
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Table A.4: Complete list of years dummies for the final model (6) of the grid-level analysis. 
Year  Coef  Std.E  
1983  .616  .861   
1984  -.776  1.221  
1985  .366  .913  
1986  -.054  1.003  
1988  -.767  1.231  
1989  -.800  1.230  
1991  1.213  .816  
1992  1.447*  .785  
1993  1.400*  .724  
1994  1.278  .831  
1995  1.168  .808  
1996  1.390*  .806  
1997  .998  .816  
1998  .996  .843  
1999  1.404*  .780  
2000  .807  .838  
2001  .870  .867  
2002  .683  .853  
2003  -.228  1.009  
2004  .172  .954  
2005  .455  .866  
2006  .851  .876  
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Descriptive statistics  
 
Table A.5: Country-level summary statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Onset 4569 .033 .179 0 1 
Previous Conflict 4526 .177 .382 0 1 
GDP/cap 5268 8.274 1.194 4.094 11.558 
Population, ln 5138 8.512 2.085 2.302 14.096 
Rough terrain 4308 2.096 1.432 0 4.557 
Noncontigious 4308 .156 .363 0 1 
New state 5829 .014 .119 0 1 
Instability 4398 .129 .335 0 1 
Anocracy 4354 .236 .424 0 1 
Ethnic frac. 4308 .409 .280 .001 .925 
Religious frac. 4308 .381 .280 0 .782 
Storms 5829 .392 1.401 0 27 
Floods 5829 .504 1.207 0 20 
Drought 5829 .069 .263 0 3 
 
 
 
Table A.6: Disaggregated analysis summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Onset 1814926 .001 .011 0 1 
Cell Population 
(log)  
1688108 8.334 3.111 0 16.700 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
1716624 9.987 1.340 6.498 16.716 
Capital distance 
(log) 
1814771 7.013 1.104 0.693 8.981 
Ex. Constraints 1709505 2.432 4.557 -6 7 
New State 1815257 .003 .058 0 1 
Rough Terrain 1816202 .225 .352 0 1 
Anocracy 1789881 .187 .390 0 1 
Floods 1816094 .018 .135 0 1 
Droughts 1677172 .108 .310 0 1 
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Multcollineriarity  
 
Table A.7: Cross-correlation table for the main variables in the disaggregated analysis 
 
Onset Pop/cell GDP/cell Distance Newstate  
Onset 1.0000 
    
 
Pop/cell 0.0121 1.0000 
   
 
GDP/cell -0.0091 -0.4694 1.0000 
  
 
Distance -0.0127 -0.5792 0.3516 1.0000 
 
 
Newstate 0.0064 0.0160 -0.0171 -0.0560 1.0000  
Terrain 0.0028 0.0160 -0.0406 0.1489 -0.0148  
Xconst -0.0020 -0.1690 0.4554 0.0567 -0.0363  
Drought 0.0002 -0.0060 0.0207 -0.0054 0.0034  
Flood 0.0006 0.0497 -0.0228 -0.0251 -0.0030  
  
Terrain Xpolity Drought Flood 
 
Terrain 1.0000 
   
 
Xconst -0.0597 1.0000 
  
 
Drought -0.0024 -0.0256 1.0000 
 
 
Flood 0.0083 0.0195 -0.0201 1.0000  
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ROC-Plots 
 
Table A.8: ROC-plot results for all models in the country-level analysis 
Model Area under ROC-curve 
(1) 0.7601 
(2) 0.7686 
(3) 0.7635 
(4) 0.7651 
(5) 0.7686 
(6) 0.7681 
 
 
Table A.8: ROC-plot results for all models in the disaggregated analysis 
Model Area under ROC-curve 
(1) 0.9024 
(2) 0.9139 
(3) 0.9042 
(4) 0.8984 
(5) 0.9034 
(6) 0.8991 
(7) 0.9001 
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Data and do-files 
 
Do-file and datasets are avaible on the accompanying USB storage device. The author is 
available for all inqueries at johanlh at gmail.com  
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